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A TACTICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
Brandon Garrett* and Seth Stoughton**
What rules regulate when police can kill? As ongoing public contro-
versy over high-profile police killings drives home, the civil, criminal,
and administrative rules governing police use of force all remain
deeply contested. Members of the public may assume that police rules
and procedures provide detailed direction for when officers can use
deadly force. However, many agencies train officers to respond to
threats according to a force "continuum" that does not provide hard-
edged rules for when or how police can use force or deadly force.
Nor, as recent cases have illustrated, does a criminal prosecution un-
der state law readily lend itself to defining appropriate police uses of
force. People might assume that the U.S. Constitution protects citizens
against completely unjustified uses of deadly force. They would be
wrong to expect clear constitutional rules either, particularly in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Connor. Can
the Fourth Amendment doctrine be revitalized? This Article begins by
excavating key lessons from an earlier moment in time when the Su-
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preme Court did, after careful consideration, adopt in Tennessee v.
Garner constitutional rules based on the then-new field of police tac-
tics. Today, where can we turn to develop sound guidance for police
use of force? Police tactics have advanced considerably in the dec-
ades since, as has policing technology. We conducted an empirical
analysis of the force policies of the fifty largest policing agencies in
the United States, and found that many agencies lacked guidance on
key subjects, such as the need to provide verbal warnings before using
force. However, we identify a consistent approach among prominent
agencies that adopt detailed policies incorporating tactical methods to
de-escalate and minimize the need to use force, some in response to
Department of Justice consent decrees. We also find real promise in
lower court rulings that rely on tactical research and policy when as-
sessing liability of police. This Article develops a theory of police use
of force grounded in the growing body of police-tactics research de-
signed to accomplish law enforcement goals while protecting the lives
of officers and citizens. The courts, law enforcement, and the public
all desperately require a revitalized constitutional standard regulating
police use offorce: It is time that we adopt a tactical Fourth Amend-
ment.
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INTRODUCTION
W HAT rules should regulate when police can kill? As ongoing pub-
lic controversy over high-profile police killings drives home, the
rules governing police use of force remain deeply contested. Members
of the public may assume that police rules and procedures provide de-
tailed direction about when officers can use deadly force. However,
many agencies train officers to respond to threats according to a force
"continuum" that does not provide hard-edged rules for when police can
use deadly force. Nor, as recent cases have illustrated, does a criminal
prosecution under state law readily lend itself to defining when police
uses of force are appropriate. Where can we turn to develop sound guid-
ance for police use of force? The answer must start with the Constitu-
tion, but current doctrine fails to provide clear guidance that can be ap-
plied by officers in the moment or by attorneys and judges in the
aftermath of an officer-involved homicide or other use of force. From
politicians, to community groups, to policing organizations, leading
voices have called into question the Fourth Amendment's "objective
reasonableness" standard, arguing that it is insufficiently protective of
life and a poor guide for law enforcement.1 We agree, but argue that
Wesley Lowery, Police Chiefs Consider Dramatic Reforms to Officer Tactics, Training
to Prevent so Many Shootings, Wash. Post (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/29/police-chiefs-consider-
dramatic-reforms-to-officer-tactics-training-to-prevent-so-many-
shootings/?utmterm=.a6l4dl9bd2Of [https://perma.cc/8Z3C-NL9Z]; Police Exec. Research
Forum, Use of Force: Taking Policing to a Higher Standard, at Policy 2 (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30guidingprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6P7-TU2Y].
Other policing organizations are more cautious. The International Association of Chiefs of
Police ("IACP") released a statement expressing concern that any changes or departures
from the constitutional standard be consistent, "carefully researched and evidence-based."
Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, IACP Statement on Use of Force (Feb. 7, 2016),
2017]
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need not be the case. The constitutional test can be reconstructed, build-
ing on early doctrine and recent lower court rulings. This Article devel-
ops a theory of force grounded in tactics research designed to accom-
plish law enforcement goals while protecting the lives of officers and
members of the public. Fourth Amendment use-of-force doctrine can be
reimagined, and it must be-if courts do not heed sound police tactics,
constitutional doctrine will fade into irrelevance.
A 2014 police shooting in Cleveland is one high-profile example that
highlights the everyday uses and misuses of Fourth Amendment law to
answer the wrong questions in the wrong ways. When an officer shot
and killed a young man named Tamir Rice, the Cuyahoga County prose-
cutor asked two policing experts to review the case. Both experts con-
fined their analysis to federal constitutional law-presumably because
they thought this analysis was dispositive of the question whether a
crime had occurred. They both emphasized the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Graham v. Connor, which set a standard of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment grounded in what the Court described as the
"split-second judgments" an officer must make in a use-of-force situa-
2tion. One expert noted that when the officers' vehicle stopped "within
feet of a gunman who had stood up" and was "reaching toward his
waistband," the officers "were responding to a situation fraught with the
potential for violence."3 Given the circumstances, the expert concluded
http://lawofficer.com/news/iacp-statement-on-use-of-force/ [https://perma.cc/857G-E7X4].
The subsequent National Consensus Policy on Use of Force released by the IACP in January
2017 does not merely restate the constitutional reasonableness baseline, but it also includes
important guidance and statements concerning de-escalation, verbal warnings, warning
shots, ongoing training, and other subjects discussed in these principles. See Int'l Assoc. of
Chiefs of Police, National Consensus Policy on Use of Force 2-4 (January 2017) [hereinafter
IACP National Consensus Policy on Use of Force], http://www.iacp.org/
Portals/O/documents/pdfs/NationalConsensus PolicyOn Use Of Force.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75XA-4NWG]. The American Law Institute has also recommended such
an approach and detailed it in draft principles for which one of the authors was an associate
reporter and assisted in drafting. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law: Policing, Use of
Force ch. 5 (October 2015) [hereinafter ALl Draft Principles] (unpublished Council Draft)
(on file with authors). We also advocate such an approach.
2 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
3 S. Lamar Sims, Investigation into the Officer-involved Shooting of Tamir Rice Which
Occurred at Cudell Park, 1910 West Boulevard, Cleveland, OH, on November 22, 2014, at





the officer who shot Rice "was reacting to an immediate threat.",4 The
second expert similarly began with the "practical effect of the Supreme
Court's decision in Graham v. Connor and other federal court cases,"
counseling deference to "an officer's need to make split-second judg-
ments" at the moment force is used.' Neither focused on what one might
expect a policing expert to opine on: whether officers acted as soundly
trained police officers in the moments leading up to the shooting. In-
deed, both disavowed such an analysis. One expert foreclosed any re-
view of whether the officers should have stopped their car ten feet away
from a potential gunman,6 concluding that doing so would be "essential-
ly, an inquiry into the officers' tactics" and "exactly the kind of Monday
morning quarterbacking the case law exhorts us to avoid."7 The other
expert joined the chorus, stating that asking whether the officers "could
have avoided the situation had they used better tactics" would require a
type of "armchair quarterbacking" not appropriate "when determining
the constitutionality of the use of force."8 Similarly, the same expert not-
ed "some dispute" about whether the officer gave any kind of warning
before firing-a crucial question-but it was deemed "insignificant to
this constitutional review."9
If the officers acted contrary to sound police tactics and policy, where
a different approach could have allowed them to advance with cover or
concealment and communicate from a safe distance, saving Rice's life, 10
then are these experts right that tactics are irrelevant to what is "reason-
able" under the Fourth Amendment? Was the county prosecutor right to
rely on similar reasoning to conclude that no charges should be present-
ed to a grand jury?11 Under this view, the Fourth Amendment can im-
4 Id.
5 Kimberly A. Crawford, Review of Deadly Force Incident: Tamir Rice 2-3 [hereinafter
Crawford Report], http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf prosecutor/en-US/Tamir/o
20Rice%2OInvestigation/Crawford-Review%20oP/o2ODeadly%20Force-Tamir/ 2ORice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GRM-NLBC].
6 Doing so placed them in a situation in which they might have to react with deadly force.
See Jeffrey J. Noble, Preliminary Expert Report of Jeffrey J. Noble 9 (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2623275-jeffrey-j-noble-expert-report.html
[https://perma.cc/9247-C9RQ].
7 Sims Report, supra note 3, at 13-14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Crawford Report, supra note 5, at 6.
9
Id. at4.
10 See, e.g., Noble, supra note 6, at 7.
1 Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Report on the November 22, 2014
Shooting Death of Tamir Rice 37-38 (Dec. 2015), http://prosecutor.
2017]
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munize the most hot-headed, ill-trained, belligerent, or incompetent of-
ficers under the guise of "reasonableness.'12 Could that be true, or do
they have the Fourth Amendment wrong?
We believe they have the Fourth Amendment wrong, but getting it
right requires drawing the correct relationship between police tactics and
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness." That work is increasingly im-
portant; ill-considered statements in Graham and other decisions rein-
force a "split-second" theory of policing that sets the wrong constitu-
tional floor.
This Article begins a project of trying to revive Fourth Amendment
use-of-force doctrine from three decades of neglect by excavating key
lessons from a moment in time when the U.S. Supreme Court did, after
careful consideration, adopt constitutional rules based on the then-new
field of police tactics. The Fourth Amendment provides a general right
to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."'' 3 That provision
has, in turn, generated a complex body of case law focused specifically
on the use of force by police. In Tennessee v. Garner, a high-water mark
of that body of case law, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that law en-
forcement could only use force proportionate to the threat faced by of-
ficers or the public. Specifically, the Court held that deadly force may
not be used against a fleeing felon who does not pose a threat of death or
great bodily harm.14 The Court did not rely on the history of the Fourth
Amendment or common law rules permitting deadly force to be used
against any fleeing felon, but instead focused on research by criminolo-
gists and the police themselves on how sound tactics could minimize the
need to use force, protecting both police and civilian lives without hin-
dering law enforcement goals. Most notably, the Court relied on then-
cutting-edge research by Dr. James J. Fyfe, whose seminal research on
cuyahogacounty.us/pdf prosecutor/en-US/Rice%20Case%20Report%20FINAL%2OFINAL
%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE3D-Q8N3]. The report emphasized Fourth Amendment
case law concerning whether the officers' actions "were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 70.
12 Id. at 40 (noting an officer that acts contrary to training may obtain qualified immunity,
even if acting "imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless" in conduct leading up to the inci-
dent (quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015))).
13 U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... .
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
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patterns of use of force was at the center of the transformative tactical-
training movement of the 1970s and 1980s.15
In contrast, the Court's subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is increasingly divorced from the tactical training that police receive to
protect their own lives and those of citizens-in part because of accom-
panying rulings like City of Los Angeles v. Heller16 and City of Canton v.
Harris,17 as well as qualified immunity rulings, that each make the train-
ing, policy, and supervision of a police agency secondary to the primary
focus on the police officer's individual actions. Perhaps in no small part
due to the individual-focused structure of the Section 1983 doctrine, the
Supreme Court's post-Garner case law has been at loggerheads with the
very fundamentals of police tactics. As a result, today's Fourth Amend-
ment case law is not only poorly suited for police training, but actually
counterproductive, confounding efforts to draft clear use-of-force poli-
cies. The impediments are the result of the flexible, "totality of the cir-
cumstances" analysis that the Supreme Court adopted to govern use of
force under the Fourth Amendment. That flexible standard grows out of
a mantra first articulated by the Court in the 1989 decision in Graham:
that officers make "split-second" decisions in use-of-force situations.
That description, originating in Justice Sandra Day O'Conner's dissent
in Garner, has animated the Court's excessive-force case law ever since.
The turn away from Garner was cemented by the Court's 2007 decision
in Scott v. Harris, which reinforced the approach in Graham by holding
that there are no clearly impermissible uses of deadly force (there is no
"magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions").'8 Instead, of-
ficers may use force, including deadly force, so long as it is objectively
reasonable to do so in the circumstances of each case.'9
The advantages of such an approach, from the perspective of avoiding
civil liability, are clear. Only the most egregious uses of force can result
in police liability and, even then, not easily. However, the approach is
not so clearly advantageous to law enforcement if the goal is to avoid
unnecessary uses of force, minimizing the situations that give rise to liti-
gation in the first instance. Indeed, where life is at stake, the burden
should be on defenders of a given practice to show that it preserves life
15 See infra Section II.A.
16 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986).
17 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).




better than a more protective alternative. It has yet to be shown, for ob-
vious reasons, that permitting officers to react in the moment is clearly a
better way to safeguard the lives of police and civilians. Further, the
"split-second" approach presents obvious problems from the perspective
of law enforcement supervisors, who cannot provide meaningful guid-
ance about or oversight of how officers react in the moment in an objec-
tively reasonable way. Moreover, that flexible case law is often parsed
by judges in the procedurally complex context of Section 1983 civil
rights litigation, which often turns on rulings regarding individual officer
immunity.20 The resulting doctrine is notoriously opaque and fact de-
pendent, providing little meaningful guidance to police officers and rare-
ly resulting in compensation to persons injured by police officers.21 Even
more unfortunate than the turn away from what we view as Garner's
key methodological insight is the fact that many police agencies adopt
the Supreme Court's vacuous constitutional baseline as a matter of de-
partment policy. Training may go further, but agencies, perhaps for lia-
bility reasons, continue to rely on statements from courts as a source for
formal guidance to officers, rather than basing practices on police-tactics
research.
The distortions engendered by Fourth Amendment excessive-force
law affect a range of police activities. This is true in the use-of-force
context, where courts determine for Fourth Amendment civil-liability
purposes whether police violence was justified at the moment it was
used without considering the circumstances that led up to that moment.
Good police departments care deeply about tactics, particularly the tac-
tics that can be used to minimize the use of force or avoid it altogether,
but limited budgets can give rise to barebones training in which instruc-
tors recite federal cases without giving officers sound guidance on when
and how to avoid potentially fatal confrontations in the first instance.
Similarly, there are no constitutional incentives for police agencies to
adopt rules or provide officers with training on how to approach and en-
gage with emotionally disturbed or disabled individuals. As a result, of-
ficers and civilians are exposed to violent confrontations that may be en-
tirely avoidable. Misapplication of constitutional doctrine has negatively
20 See infra Section I.C.
21 See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1119, 1119-20 (2008) (calling the Supreme Court's standard "indeterminate and undertheo-
rized" and "confused"). Scholars have criticized excessive-force case law on several fronts,
and some have advocated state law depart from the Constitution. See infra note 32.
[Vol. 103:211218
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impacted the everyday work police do. As we describe in Part II, police-
tactics research and policy have changed even as the Supreme Court has
entrenched its "split-second" approach toward police liability. Ongoing
developments in best practices and training, building on the seminal
work of Fyfe in the 1970s, have further refined the science of police tac-
tics. Surveys of police policies on the use of force suggest that there is a
wide array of approaches that agencies use.
We found as much when studying force policies of the fifty largest
policing agencies in the United States. The empirical study presented in
Part II reflects wide variation, but leading agencies incorporate lessons
from decades of police-tactics research, consistently adopting detailed
rules that are far more instructive and protective than the constitutional
baseline.22 A substantial number of agencies specifically addressed cer-
tain aspects of police tactics, including guidance on de-escalation (twen-
ty-four), the need to minimize use of force (twenty-four), and suggesting
tactics that could prevent the need to use force (twenty-seven). As those
numbers suggest, many of the fifty largest agencies lack clear policies
on these important issues. And even those comparatively sophisticated
agencies that had written policies had very different approaches and
many lacked guidance on key subjects. For example, many agencies did
not require officers to provide, when feasible, verbal warnings before us-
ing deadly (and nondeadly) force.
To the extent that there is consistency, we suggest it grows out of the
dissemination of best practices within the policing industry, including
through the top-down direction provided by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice ("DOJ"). DOJ consent decrees often instigated policy reviews and
resulted in policies with greater detail on tactics surrounding use of
force. Those policies provide a model for training police on when and
how to use force. In Part II, we describe the empirical foundations for
sound tactics training and how it is developed in particular situations,
such as those involving emotionally disturbed persons, disabled persons,
and vehicle pursuits. The focus of sound tactical training is on giving of-
ficers time to make decisions from a position of safety and to de-escalate
to avoid the need for force.
One response to the apparent disconnect between sound police prac-
tices and Fourth Amendment doctrine is to dismiss court-made law as
out of date and ill advised. Leading policing organizations such as the
22 See infra Part II and Appendix: Use of Force Policies, Fifty Largest Agencies by Size.
2017] 219
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Police Executive Research Forum ("PERF") are doing just that. PERF
recently endorsed a range of tactical decision-making practices we de-
scribe, including de-escalation, emphasizing that they seem to take po-
lice departments to "a higher standard than the legal requirements of
Graham v. Connor.' '23 We agree that the Graham test is "necessary but
not sufficient.,24 However, in Part III, we suggest that Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine can be resuscitated, making the constitutional floor "high-
er" and more informative-even given the confines of the structure of
Section 1983 litigation. In some U.S. circuits, police encounters are at
least "segmented" in a way that permits courts to focus on whether force
was justified at different phases of an encounter-a decision that is often
informed by testimony from leading experts on police tactics-and
which reinforces for police agencies the importance of careful training
and informed policy on the use of force. This is, in our view, an essential
component of police reform. Courts and other policy makers-and legis-
lators and policing agencies may be far more promising sources for re-
form than civil litigation-should look less at "snapshots" of the mo-
ment when force is used in individual cases and more at the series of
events, including the officer's actions, leading to the moment force is
applied. Not only should the time period be expanded, but the content of
the analysis should focus on police tactics. In Part III, we describe how
that can occur, consistent with Garner, and, perhaps surprisingly, with
qualified immunity case law that has developed in the decades since.
This Article does not focus on the crucially important intersection be-
tween race and the use of force. Statistics suggest that officers use force
more against minorities than Whites, as well as disparately using types
of force, including deadly force.25 Some "shoot/don't shoot" research
23 Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policy 2. The IACP has also described
improvements and additional guidance beyond the constitutional baseline in its National
Consensus Policy on Use of Force. IACP National Consensus Policy on Use of Force, supra
note 1.
24 Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policy 2.
25 See Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of Police Shootings, 54
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 189, 199-202 (2017); Justin Nix et al., Fatal Shootings by US Police Of-
ficers in 2015: A Bird's Eye View, 83 Police Chief Mag. 48, 50 (2016); FBI Uniform Crime
Reporting Data Program, Supplementary Homicide Report (2012),
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/35023 [https://perma.cc/6RCH-
HVU8] ("[This dataset] provide[s] detailed information on criminal homicides reported to
the police."). Regarding the lack of adequate data, see, for example, James J. Fyfe, Too
Many Missing Cases: Holes in our Knowledge About Police Use of Force, 4 Just. Res. &
Pol'y 87, 88-90 (2002). But see Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Dif-
[Vol. 103:211220
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suggests that race does not affect an officer's decision making at the
moment the trigger is pulled.26 Yet even if an officer's actual split-
second decision isn't race dependent, the series of events that puts an of-
ficer in that position might very well be; troubling statistics suggest it
too often is. 27 The relationship of race and tactics is even less well un-
derstood than the relationship between race and force, and far more re-
search should explore these questions.
This Article departs from much of the thrust of modern scholarship on
the Fourth Amendment, which we seek to reorient. Existing theory of
the Fourth Amendment focuses on whether courts should rely on the his-
tory of the Fourth Amendment, on practicalities of police discretion and
law enforcement goals, or on other theories such as conceptions of indi-
vidual dignity and privacy.28 Professor Tracey Maclin and others have
written important work examining the legacy of Terry v. Ohio, and law
enforcement policy and race discrimination in the area of stop-and-frisk
and street encounters.29 This Article aims to do something similar in the
force area by exploring the mixed legacy of Garner, developing neglect-
ed strains in the majority opinion that could become more influential
now that police departments have made tactics a priority, albeit one not
driven by Fourth Amendment considerations.3 ° Our approach is con-
sistent with Professor Rachel Harmon's work excavating support for
doctrines of imminence, necessity, and proportionality from self-defense
ferences in Police Use of Force 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22399, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22399 [https://perma.cc/5F3K-V8AA] (finding
that, controlling for context and civilian behavior, there was no evidence of racial disparity
in police shootings).
6 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1006, 1015 (2007).
27 See infra Section 11.G.
28 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 197, 201-02 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court "has ignored or distorted
the history of the Fourth Amendment"); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment:
Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1754
(1994).
29 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1271, 1276-77 (1998).
30 On the exclusionary rule and approaches that can incentivize "accountability-based po-
licing," see David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce-Or Re-
place-The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 149, 155 (2009).
2017]
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law.3 1 Other scholars focus more on policy than constitutional doctrine,
and argue, for example, as Professors Ian Ayres and Dan Markovitz
have done, that state law should prohibit police from using deadly force
32
in the course of misdemeanor-or certain other categories of-arrests.
Police tactics should similarly inform any such proposals. No proposal
to limit police use of force in a way that would unduly put officers' lives
in danger should or would be adopted in judicial opinions, through legis-
lation, or by law enforcement agencies.
As the Justices acknowledged in Garner, and have implicitly
acknowledged many times since, the history of the Fourth Amendment
is a distant guide. Today, officers must examine uses of vehicles in pur-
suit, modem handguns and rifles, TASERs, pepper spray, and other new
and developing techniques of employing varying degrees of force. Re-
search on the effects of stress on officers, interactions with emotionally
disturbed and disabled individuals, and other topics will continue to im-
prove policy and practice. We conclude by asking how we can build on
key lessons from Garner and the early police-tactics revolution, present
in aspects of more recent case law, to construct a tactical Fourth
Amendment doctrine grounded in today's still-advancing tactics re-
search and technology. We conclude that a reasonable officer is a well-
trained officer, who has received instruction on sound police tactics.
Our approach focuses on an empirical grounding for constitutional "rea-
sonableness"-to better inform constitutional doctrine and to make clear
the empirical foundations for sound police policy.
I. THE ARC OF FOURTH AMENDMENT USE-OF-FORCE DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy and liberty by
guaranteeing "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
3' Harmon, supra note 21, at 1172-73. We agree such concepts are only "implicit" in the
Court's use-of-force doctrine, but we develop how such concepts are more broadly support-
ed by modem police practices and that doctrine can be consistent with sound tactics.32 Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovitz, Ending Excessive Police Force Starts with New Rules of
Engagement, Wash. Post (Dec. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/ending-excessive-police-force-starts-with-new-rules-of-engagement/2014 12/25/
7fa379c0-8ale-1 e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58 story.html?utm term=.fb8a8c9edf05
[https://perma.cc/ZR6F-TZSF] (arguing police should not be "permitted to initiate force" in
cases of misdemeanor arrests). As we argue, police are correct to view force as necessary
when proportional to the threat faced in a situation and not necessarily depending on the type
of crime and whether it is "minor."
222 [Vol. 103:211
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zures."33 The application of physical force by an officer constitutes a
seizure and is thus subject to Fourth Amendment protection.34 To deter-
mine whether an intrusive government action runs afoul of that protec-
tion, the Fourth Amendment requires balancing "the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake."35 In the use-of-force
context, as we will develop, this balancing test has been interpreted as
requiring "'objective reasonableness' under the circumstances.36 This is
a simultaneously open-ended and quite constrained "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test, however, very different from "totality of the circum-
stances" tests to be found in other areas of constitutional law. As the
Court emphasized more recently in Scott v. Harris, there is no "easy-to-
apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context," but instead, courts
must "slosh" through "the factbound morass of 'reasonableness.'37 De-
spite the suggestion that this is a broad review, the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test is both deferential and constrained.
The Supreme Court has emphasized how courts reviewing police vio-
lence must take into account how "officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving."3 8 The situation must be evaluated from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable police officer, and the use of hindsight must be
avoided.39 Thus, the operative facts are those known to the officer at the
moment that force is employed.40 As that standard suggests, the Fourth
Amendment analysis is limited in scope. The reasonableness of the of-
ficer's actions prior to use of force, particularly the possibility that the
officer contributed to the creation of the dangerous situation itself, is not
relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Once one understands how
the Supreme Court has cabined the relevant circumstances, one appreci-
ates that it is not a "totality of the circumstances" test at all. The legality
of the officer's actions is based on the information possessed by the of-
ficer at the moment force is employed, what some criminologists have
33 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
34 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991).
35 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at 399.
3' 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
38 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
" Id. at 396.
40 See, e.g., Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927
F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).
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titled "subjective objectivity. '4 Nor is it precisely a "reasonableness"
test. Reasonable professionals, it may be safely asserted, do not make
life or death decisions if they can avoid it through preparation, training,
or tactics.
This modem test under the Fourth Amendment (and accompanying
and related qualified immunity case law interpreting Section 1983) is of
relatively recent vintage; it had not quite taken shape when Garner was
decided in 1985. In discussing Garner, though, one must understand
why the Supreme Court has focused to such a degree on the actions of
individual officers and not on police agencies and their training, supervi-
sion, and policy. The reason has to do with the structure of modem civil
rights litigation, itself defined by the Court during the same time period
that this Fourth Amendment doctrine took shape. Following the discus-
sion of Garner, and then of the structure of modem Section 1983 law,
we ask whether the doctrine could have taken another direction had the
stars aligned differently at the Court.
A. Tennessee v. Garner: Uncovering the Garner Approach
The modem Fourth Amendment excessive-force jurisprudence took
shape in the wake of Garner. That seminal case is so critical not because
of its influence on what came afterward, we will argue, but because of
crucial insights in the decision that have largely been neglected in the
decades since. It is those lost aspects of Garner that need to be recov-
ered.
Paralleling some of the most controversial use-of-force incidents in
recent months and years, Garner involved the death of Edward Garner,
an unarmed black fifteen-year-old eighth-grader, in Memphis, Tennes-
see.4 2 Late one evening, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and
Leslie Wright were dispatched to a burglary in progress.43 When they ar-
rived, a neighbor told them that "she had heard glass breaking and that
'they' or 'someone' was breaking in next door.,44 Officer Hymon went
behind the house in time to hear a door slam and see someone-
41 Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man?: Po-
lice and Excessive Force, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 481, 486 (1994).
42 Samuel Walker et al., The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America 144
(5th ed. 2012). Notably, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion identifies Gamer's
race.




Gamer-"run across the backyard" of the burglarized house.45 By virtue
of his flashlight, Officer Hymon spotted Garner crouching near a six-
foot-high chain link fence.46 Seeing Garner's face, Officer Hymon be-
lieved him to be seventeen or eighteen years old and between 5'5" and
5'7" tall.47 More importantly, he could see Garner's hands, and he was
"reasonably sure" that Garner was unarmed.48 Officer Hymon identified
himself as an officer and shouted for Garner to halt, taking "a few steps
toward him," but Garner began climbing the fence.4 9 Officer Hymon,
who was thirty to forty feet away from Gamer,5 ° was "convinced" that
Garner would escape if he made it over the fence.5' To prevent that es-
cape, Officer Hymon shot at Garner, hitting him in the back of the
head.52 Garner died on an operating table shortly after.53
Officer Hymon fired the fatal shot under the auspices of a common
law rule, a Tennessee statute, and a policy of the Memphis Police De-
partment. Under the common law, police were authorized to use deadly
force to stop fleeing felons, although they were forbidden to do so to
stop fleeing misdemeanants.54 So clear was this rule that the Court de-
scribed its "common-law pedigree" as "pure on its face."5 The Tennes-
see statute was just as clear. It stated, with regard to fleeing felons, that
"[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or
forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the
arrest.,56 The policy of the Memphis Police Department did not go quite
so far; it limited the use of deadly force in some ways, but permitted it to
stop a fleeing burglar.57 Yet despite the clarity and pedigree of the rules
that authorized Officer Hymon's actions, a six-Justice majority held that
Officer Hymon had violated the Fourth Amendment.58
45 Id.
41 Id. at 3-4.
47 Id.48 Id. at 3.
491 Id. at 4.
50 John H. Blume III, Deadly Force in Memphis: Tennessee v. Garner, 15 Cumb. L. Rev.
89, 89 (1984).
51 Garner, 471 U.S. at 4.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id. at 15.
56 Id. at 4-5 (alterations in original) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
57 1d. at 5.
58 Id. at 22.
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What made the Court's decision in Garner stand out? It was not
statements of what should have been painfully obvious to all involved,
like "[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is un-
matched," or that "[tlhe use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of
apprehending a suspect."' 9 Nor even was it the introduction of propor-
tionality into the Fourth Amendment analysis, implicit in the holding
that deadly force is justified only when "the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others.,60 The Court's elaboration on that point-that
an officer may use deadly force when threatened "with a weapon" or a
"threat of serious physical harm"61-was similarly banal.
Instead, what made Garner remarkable was a passage that Justice By-
ron White wrote in response to the argument that stripping officers of
the ability to use deadly force to stop fleeing felons would hamper effec-
tive law enforcement. Specifically, "it [was] argued that overall violence
will be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who
know that they may be shot if they flee. 62 The state statute and depart-
ment policy were justified, so the argument went, because the "meaning-
ful threat of deadly force" might dissuade people from fleeing when po-
lice attempted to arrest them.63 The fleeing-felon rule existed in part to
promote compliance with police and to deter crime. And although it was
predictable, this argument was not without some merit. After all, the
Tennessee statute codified the common law rule, and deference was due
to the policy justifications supporting the Legislature's decision.
But the Supreme Court did not defer to the Tennessee legislature. In-
stead, it called the underlying justifications into question by observing
that "a majority of police departments in this country have forbidden the
use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects.64 That mattered, be-
cause it suggested that effective law enforcement did not depend on the
fleeing-felon rule. "If those charged with the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law have abjured the use of deadly force in arresting nondangerous
felons," the Court emphasized, "there is a substantial basis for doubting
that the use of such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power in
59 Id. at 9-10.6 1 Id. at 11.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 9.
63 Id. at 10.
6Id. at 10-11.
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all felony cases.,,6' The Court then engaged in an extensive review of
police policies, explicitly mentioning the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the New York City Police Department, and forty-four other law en-
forcement agencies. It cited research by the Boston Police Department
Planning and Research Division and by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police ("IACP") for the proposition that most police depart-
ments had abandoned the common law rule in favor of a more restrictive
policy. And it relied on the accreditation criteria of the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies ("CALEA"), which estab-
lished a restrictive deadly force policy as an industry best practice.66
The Court then noted why so many police agencies had abandoned a
rule that, on its face, seemed to provide an unmitigated benefit to law
enforcement. The Court cited to two pieces authored by Garner's expert
in the case, Dr. James J. Fyfe.67 The first was his article "Observations
on Police Deadly Force"; the second, an amicus brief that he authored
for the Police Foundation.68 Fyfe's article identified the fundamental er-
ror with the argument raised by Officer Hymon and the State of Tennes-
see: There was a complete lack of evidence supporting any "clear asso-
ciation between police shootings and reduced crime rates.,69 Fyfe argued
in that piece that the traditional fleeing-felon rule should be abandoned
by police departments, to be replaced with clear policies, training, and
supervision on the use of deadly force and the careful investigation of all
police shootings. By the time of the Garner decision, the majority of po-
lice departments in the United States had followed suit.
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of reviewing actual
police practice rather than just reaffirming the existence of a common
law rule, clear though it was. Blind adherence to a common law rule that
permitted any amount of force, including deadly force, to stop a fleeing
felon, would ignore "sweeping change in the legal and technological
65 Id. at 11.
66 Id. 18-19.
67 Id. at 10 n.10.
68 James J. Fyfe, Observations on Police Deadly Force, 27 Crime & Delinq. 376, 378-81
(1981) [hereinafter Fyfe, Observations]. The Court also cited to an affidavit from the New
York City Police Department, an amicus brief from the Police Foundation, and William A.
Geller & Kevin J. Karales, Split-Second Decisions: Shootings of and by Chicago Police 35,
39 (1981). See also James J. Fyfe, Police Expert Witnesses, in Expert Witnesses: Criminolo-
gists in the Courtroom 100, 112 n.1 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree Jr. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Fyfe, Police Expert Witnesses] (noting that Fyfe was the defendant's ex-
pert in Garner and drafted the amicus brief).
69 Fyfe, Observations, supra note 68, at 379.
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context.,70 Specifically, the Court noted that the common law rule had
developed in an era where far fewer crimes were classified as felonies
and "when virtually all felonies were punishable by death."'', The com-
mon law rule also developed in a time when officers had only rudimen-
tary hand-to-hand weapons, meaning that they were less capable of us-
ing deadly force. Moreover, because officers were limited to such
weapons, any situation in which an officer could use force on a fleeing
felon required the officer to be in such close proximity to the suspect
that "the safety of the arresting officer was at risk.,72 Although explicitly
about preventing a fleeing felon's escape, the Court realized that the
common law rule implicated officer safety in a way that no longer ap-
plied once officers started carrying handguns.73
As a result of these observations, the Court held, "[R]eliance on the
common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ig-
nores the purposes of a historical inquiry., 74 No more could the courts
turn to history to answer questions about police violence.
B. Split-Second Syndrome: From Graham to Harris
History would not be the focus of subsequent cases, but neither would
a careful assessment of police practices and policy.75 That approach
would be neglected in the decades that were to come. The seeds of that
neglect were planted in the Garner dissent, authored by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and then-
Justice William Rehnquist.
Acknowledging the "unquestionably tragic" nature of Edward Gar-
ner's death, the dissent nevertheless would have upheld the constitution-
70 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 14-15.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 13.
75 Garner was not the first Supreme Court decision to carefully engage with police tactics.
One prior example can be found in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, decided in 1977, which cited a
study of police tactics, noting, "[W]e have specifically recognized the inordinate risk con-
fronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile," and pointing out that
according to a study, "approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer
approached a suspect seated in an automobile." 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam) (quot-
ing, in the second part, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Allen P. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation,
54 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 93 (1963))). However, Garner engaged with po-
lice practices and policy far more carefully than prior decisions.
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ality of Officer Hymon's decision to shoot an unarmed, fleeing burglar.
To support that conclusion, the dissent emphasized the "difficult, split-
second decisions police officers must make in these circumstances.76
(Fyfe would later call this the "split-second syndrome" or fallacy.
77) Jus-
tice O'Connor and her fellow dissenters argued that the use of deadly
force to stop a fleeing burglar would be, in some cases, the only way of
preventing escape. Although "some law enforcement agencies may
choose to assume the risk that a criminal will remain at large," the dis-
sent held, a contrary policy decision was not beyond the pale.7' Nor, to
the dissent, was a decision based on the potential deterrent value of a
permissive rule inappropriate. The dissent found that "the effectiveness
of police use of deadly force [as a deterrent] is arguable," and although it
acknowledged that "many States or individual police departments have"
adopted a restrictive rule, the dissent contended that "it should go with-
out saying that the effectiveness or popularity of a particular police prac-
tice does not determine its constitutionality.79 Nor was the lack of sup-
port for the efficacy of the fleeing-felon rule at all problematic; a state,
the dissent argued, was not under any obligation to "produce social sci-
ence statistics or to dispel any possible doubts" about its policy choic-
es.
80
More pertinently, the dissent argued that, for officers, the apprehen-
sion of a criminal "necessarily [involves] swift action predicated up-
on... on-the-spot observations."81 The dissent sharply criticized the ma-
jority's rule, writing that, "The Court's silence on critical factors in the
decision to use deadly force simply invites second-guessing of difficult
police decisions that must be made quickly in the most trying of circum-
stances."2 By limiting the ability of officers to use deadly force to situa-
tions in which they faced a threat to themselves or others, the dissent be-
lieved that the majority was putting far too demanding a burden on
officers, who "are given no guidance for determining which objects,
76 Garner, 471 U.S. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77 James J. Fyfe, The Split-Second Syndrome and Other Determinants of Police Violence,
in Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings 466, 475-77 (Roger G. Dunham &
Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 2010).
78 Garner, 471 U.S. at 27-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).791 Id. at 28.
80 
Id.
81 Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
82 Id. at 32.
2017]
Virginia Law Review
among an array of potentially lethal weapons ranging from guns to
knives to baseball bats to rope, will justify the use of deadly force.,
83
Given the nature of police encounters, the "clarity of hindsight cannot
provide the standard for judging the reasonableness of police decisions
made in uncertain and often dangerous circumstances.,
84
That reasoning would become prominent in the Court's rulings in the
years to follow. It found its strongest expression i  Graham v. Connor, a
Section 1983 case in which Dethome Graham claimed that officers used
excessive force in the process of detaining him for investigation.85 The
case was one ripe for a discussion of the role of sound policy and train-
ing when evaluating the reasonableness of officers' decisions. Yet the
Graham decision was particularly noteworthy in what it did not discuss.
Although officers believed Graham, who they saw enter and then
quickly leave a convenience store, to be drunk, he was not-he was a
diabetic suffering from an insulin reaction. The officer at the scene re-
quested backup, and the officers who arrived tightly handcuffed Graham
despite his pleas to get him sugar and to check his wallet for a card
showing that he was a diabetic. At one point, Graham lost conscious-
ness. Graham's friend brought him orange juice, but the officers refused
to let him have it. One officer said: "I've seen a lot of people with sugar
diabetes that never acted like this. Ain't nothing wrong with the M. F.
but drunk. Lock the S. B. up."'86 Officers "placed him face down" on the
hood of his friend's car, and later "[flour officers grabbed Graham and
threw him headfirst into the police car."87 Graham, as the Court noted,
"sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an
injured shoulder; he also claim[ed] to have developed a loud ringing in
his right ear."'8 Eventually, the initial officer "received a report that
Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store, and the offic-
ers drove him home and released him." 89
The conduct of the officers reads like a classically botched job, in
which the officers lacked or ignored training on how to respond to a dis-
abled person. They were investigating behavior that struck them as sus-
83 Id.
84 Id. at 26.
85490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
86 Id. at 389.
87 Id.




picious-Graham had walked into and then out of the convenience store
in his search for something to stabilize his blood sugar°-not any par-
ticular crime. Nor were they asked to make "split-second" judgments;
they had ample opportunity to verify that he was diabetic and to treat
him as he went in and out of consciousness. This case was not the ideal
vehicle to develop the notion that police officers must sometimes make
quick-fire decisions and that an objective standard might best be used to
analyze excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment.
Although the officers were mistaken, the Court suggested that such
conduct would not violate the Fourth Amendment. "The calculus of rea-
sonableness," the Court wrote, "must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments[] in cir-
cumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."9 That de-
scription has been so often repeated that, as one of us has written:
Were some future anthropologists to turn to the federal reporters to
form an opinion about the environment in which law enforcement of-
ficers use force, they would have little choice but to conclude that
those "circumstances [were] tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing".... Since the Supreme Court first introduced that description in
1989, federal district and circuit courts have repeated it on more than
2300 occasions. It features widely in briefs and trial court documents
and has made its way into federal and state pattern jury instructions. It
is, by any measure, the accepted depiction of the environment in
which police officers use force.
92
However, the Supreme Court never discussed whether this (highly
problematic) use of force was reasonable on the merits; the focus was
instead on making clear that an objective reasonableness standard ap-
plies (together with the dicta on "rapidly evolving" situations in which
"split-second judgments" must be made).93 To be sure, the Court was
right to emphasize that timing matters: that force should not be deemed
reasonable if there was no "immediate threat to the safety of the offic-
90 Id. at 388-89.
9' Id. at 396-97.
92 Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 847, 865 (2014) (alteration in origi-
nal) (footnotes omitted).
9 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
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ers."94 In addition to cementing the deferential standard of review that
would be used going forward, the Graham decision also put to rest an
issue that had divided the circuits: whether substantive due process anal-
ysis was appropriate for excessive-use-of-force claims. As applied by
lower courts, a substantive due process approach would have included
determining whether officers acted in good faith or "maliciously and sa-
distically for the very purpose of causing harm."95 That determination,
the Court held, was inappropriate: The Fourth Amendment alone gov-
erned police use of force, and, under the Fourth Amendment, the subjec-
tive motivations of individual officers are entirely irrelevant to the ulti-
mate question of whether their actions were reasonable.96 The rejection
of a more subjective and substantive due process approach was a posi-
tive contribution of the Graham decision; the clear adoption of an objec-
tive standard had the promise of better imposing clear and informed
standards of care. What was unfortunate, then, was how subsequent de-
cisions did not focus on reasonableness informed by standards of care,
but rather established a highly deferential inquiry focusing on an indi-
vidual officer's actions.
The seeds laid in Justice O'Connor's Garner dissent bore fruit in
Graham, but it was not until Scott v. Harris that they completely
eclipsed the Court's original approach to police violence. In Harris, an
officer initiated a traffic stop after clocking Victor Harris's car travelling
at seventy-three miles per hour on a stretch of road with a fifty-five-
mile-per-hour speed limit.97 Rather than pull over, Harris fled, leading
officers on a six-minute pursuit that reached speeds of eighty-five miles
per hour.98 To terminate the pursuit, Deputy Sheriff Timothy Scott at-
tempted to use the Precision Intervention Technique ("PIT"), a maneu-
ver intended to force a fleeing vehicle into a controlled spin by pushing
the rear quarter panel of the fleeing car with the front quarter panel of a
94 Id. at 396; see also Harmon, supra note 21, at 1131 (noting that the Graham Court's
"approach falls critically short in addressing this crucial matter because it suggests that tim-
ingis one factor to be considered among many, when it is often simply dispositive").
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id.; see also Jill 1. Brown, Defining "Reasonable" Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor
and Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1257, 1267-69 (1991) (describing the
in uiry).
550 U.S. at 374.
9' Id. at 374-75.
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police vehicle.99 Deputy Scott had no training in how to perform the
technique, however, and so he put his front bumper on Harris's rear
bumper and accelerated.00 Harris lost control of his car, which ran off
the road and overturned, rendering him quadriplegic. Harris filed suit
under Section 1983, contending that the situation did not satisfy Gar-
ner's requirement for deadly force. 1'
The Supreme Court declared once and for all that Garner would be
distinguished or reinterpreted to mean something quite limited:
Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid
preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute "deadly force."
Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment's "rea-
sonableness" test [citing Graham] to the use of a particular type of
force in a particular situation.'
0 2
To rewrite Garner in that way is mistaken. Indeed, as Justice Breyer
pointed out in his concurring opinion, and as Justice Stevens argued
more forcefully in dissent, the Court itself ventured into declaring an in-
flexible or "absolute" per se rule that: "A police officer's attempt to ter-
minate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of inno-
cent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.'
0 3
Moreover-and this is something entirely missing in the judicial uses
of Garner and the scholarly commentary on Garner-what made Gar-
ner distinctive was not just that the Court cited to clear factors making
the use of deadly force impermissible in that case (the "bright-line" view
of Garner).0 4 Instead, we argue, it was the method (which, to be sure,
the Court has all but ignored in the years since): focusing on police prac-
tices and tactics.
'9 Id. at 375.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 375-76.
102 Id. at 382.
103 Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 386) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court today sets forth a per se rule
thatpresumes its own version of the facts ....").
10 Harmon, supra note 21, at 1128 ("Lower court cases following Garner have taken the
decision to establish a bright-line rule for the use of force against fleeing suspects that deadly
force is justified-which is to say constitutionally reasonable-only against dangerous fel-
ons in flight .... ).
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The Harris decision was notable in the way that it ignored the subject
of police policy and practice. None of the Justices focused on the issue
of police practices in the area-an issue on which experts provided opin-
ions at trial and one that the parties briefed and developed through depo-
sition testimony. Justice Stevens briefly noted that police might have al-
ternatives, like the use of "stop sticks" to stop a fleeing vehicle, but did
not discuss in any detail proper police training.1°5 Although it is absent
from both the Court's opinion and the dissent, the record below focused
not just on alternatives to a police chase, but also on the policy and train-
ing provided to the officers that chose to engage in this high-speed
chase. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the record in the Harris
case was Deputy Scott's deposition testimony admitting that he had no
training on how to conduct the PIT maneuver that he used to stop Har-
ris's vehicle, and that he received authorization to use the maneuver
without discussing any relevant details with his supervisor.0 6 On that is-
sue, the testimony was as follows:
Q.... It's my understanding now from going through all your
training, you were never trained in any manner in the-in the [PIT]
maneuver?
A. At that-up until this incident?
Q. Yeah.
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. And how is it you even learned of the pit maneuver or
that it can be utilized as a pursuit tactic?
A. Through other officers that have received the training ... 07
05 Harris, 550 U.S. at 396-97, 397 n.9.
106 Deposition of Timothy C. Scott at 129-41, Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-148-
WBH (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2002). Notably, Deputy Scott rammed Harris's fleeing vehicle not
in his home jurisdiction, but in a neighboring jurisdiction that did not permit high-speed
chases for safety reasons. Id. at 174-79.
107 Id. at 127.
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Deputy Scott did not know, for example, that the Georgia State Police
only authorized officers to use the high-risk PIT maneuver after receiv-
ing forty-five hours of training.0 8 The officer admitted in his deposition
to having incorrectly used this maneuver (which was unsurprising given
the lack of training on how to perform it). As he put it, "I did not [PIT]
Victor Harris" although his "intentions were to do a [PIT]." Instead, he
made "a[n] intentional direct contact" with his vehicle to try to bring
Harris's vehicle to a stop.109
The plaintiff's expert in the case opined that a PIT maneuver can only
be used in "a set of defined circumstances ... (i.e., at low speeds on
wide straightaways, on dry pavement by a properly trained driver). 110
The expert noted that many policing agencies have "formulated policies
and training materials that reflect" the dangers of use of deadly force in
a pursuit situation.11 For example, the IACP Model Pursuit Policy at the
time stated: "Officers may not intentionally use their vehicle to bump or
ram the suspect's vehicle in order to force the vehicle to a stop off the
road or in a ditch."'1 12 The expert concluded that where the Coweta
County department had trained none of its officers on how to use this
highly dangerous PIT maneuver, yet allowed them to use the technique
in inappropriate circumstances, the officers involved were not properly
trained.13 Further, the expert opined, the officers were improperly su-
pervised: The supervisor who approved the application of the PIT ma-
neuver-telling Deputy Scott, via radio, "Yeah, go ahead and take him
out. Take him out."--had no knowledge about the speed, road condi-
tions, or other circumstances of the pursuit.1 4 The result, according to
the expert, was a use of deadly force that was "objectively unreasona-
ble."
1 5
"' Id. at 130. Deputy Scott received the training and a "certificate" after the pursuit and
crash at issue in this litigation. Id. at 129-31.
9 Id. at 132, 135. The Coweta County police department had a policy allowing officers,
even untrained officers, to use "[d]eliberate physical contact" to stop a fleeing vehicle with
the approval of a supervisor. Id. at 152.
110 Affidavit of Dr. Geoffrey P. Alpert at 5, Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2002).
" Id. at 8.
112 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
'13 Id. at 11-12.
114 Id. at 11. The conclusion of the expert report mistakenly refers to Deputy Scott as au-





Of course, the defendants also retained an expert, who concluded that
the County's policy on pursuits was "consistent with numerous other
policies by other law enforcement agencies," and that additional "super-
vision and training to the Deputies" would "not alter the appropriate-
ness" of their actions in this case; further, the expert opined that many
"United States law enforcement agencies do not provide instruction to
their officers in vehicle-to-vehicle contact."
' ' 16
Rather than discuss any of this factual and expert evidence, the Harris
decision instead discussed the "relative culpability" of the officer and
the victim of the force, a novel concept in Fourth Amendment law: a
concept not just of fault, but of comparative fault. The majority ex-
plained, relying heavily on the videotape evidence from the officers'
cruiser cameras that: "It was respondent, after all, who intentionally
placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the
reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between
two evils that Scott confronted."'17 Although it compared the officers
with the fleeing suspect, the majority failed to compare the actions of the
officers in this case with the actions that may have been taken by well-
trained police officers-actions that might have avoided the high-speed
chase or the need to use deadly force.
That aspect of the opinion is more understandable where the focus
was on the most immediate decision to use the force. However, even
given that focus, the lack of discussion of how the officer used force-
using a maneuver that he was not trained on and admittedly botched-
deserved far more discussion. If an officer had never been told how to
use a firearm and admittedly fired it incorrectly, perhaps expecting it to
have some effect other than it does, the jury would have had to consider
serious questions concerning the reasonableness of the force. The spe-
cialized topic of high-speed chases and use of a police vehicle to stop a
fleeing motorist, however, apparently eluded the Justices' attention en-
tirely.
One could go on. More recent rulings from the Supreme Court have
adopted the same view of reasonableness absent any reasonable standard
of care. The Court's 2015 ruling in City & County of San Francisco v.
Sheehan similarly disregarded what a reasonable and trained officer
16 Expert Witness Report by Michael A. Brave at 6, Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-
148-WBH (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2002).
1"7 Harris, 550 U.S. at 384.
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would do in approaching a mentally ill person."1 8 The Court's per curiam
opinion in Mullenix v. Luna found qualified immunity appropriate where
an officer shot a fleeing vehicle from a highway overpass contrary to
policy, training, supervisor's instructions, and best practices.119
C. The Structure of Section 1983 Litigation Against Police
The entire structure of federal civil rights litigation redirects the focus
from systemic issues of policy, practice, supervision, and training, to the
individual conduct of an officer. Civil rights litigation does not directly
target police policymakers. Most such lawsuits name only individual of-
ficers as defendants, any judgments will be covered by municipal insur-
ance, and even cases formally brought against the municipality will typ-
ically result in money judgments also covered by insurance (although
perhaps affecting the cost of such insurance or self-insurance)."0 It is
difficult to bring larger suits, whether individual suits raising questions
of policy, or class actions seeking injunctive relief to change policy re-
garding the use of excessive force. As one federal judge has put it,
"[c]laims of excessive physical force require a case-by-case analysis of
the circumstances in order to determine whether the amount of force
used in each scenario was commensurate with the perceived need for
force.,,12' There is a range of doctrinal reasons why civil rights litigation
focuses on individual officers and not on policy.
One reason why individual suits cannot easily affect policy and prac-
tice is that the Supreme Court adopted Article III limitations on actions
seeking injunctive relief in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, focusing there
on the circumstances of the particular use of force by the police and the
question whether it represented a sufficiently uniform policy. 22 The Ly-
ons Court ruled it would not presume putative class members would be
118 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015).
'19 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306-07, 312 (2015) (per curiam).
120 See Charles R. Epp, Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation of
the Legalistic State 93-114 (2009); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public
Police, 130 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3-4),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2733783 [https://perma.cc/TH8W-768Z]; Joanna C. Schwartz, Po-
lice Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 890 (2014).
121 Jones 'El v. Berge, No. 00-C-421-C, 2001 WL 34379611, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 14,
2001) ("Because the inquiry is highly individualized, plaintiffs' claim that the physical force
used against mentally ill inmates at Supermax is excessive does not pass the typicality or
commonality prerequisites to class certification under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23(a).").
122 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).
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likely to break the law and then encounter police in the future.123 The
Court also emphasized general principles of restraint in enjoining law
enforcement, for reasons of comity and federalism.124 Following Lyons,
courts have held that, in order to obtain class-wide relief, a claimant
would have to show that police behaved in the same unconstitutionally
excessive way in sufficiently similar circumstances. That has been rarely
achieved in use-of-force cases, although the standard has been met in
search cases where a showing has been made that police followed a
"blanket policy" that does not require individualized reasonable suspi-
cion judgments at all-such as a policy of strip searching all detainees
regardless of reasonable suspicion,125 or in cases in which evidence
strongly demonstrated reliance on race and not on reasonable suspi-
cion. 121
In addition, the structure of municipal liability under Section 1983
makes policy and practice claims against a city very difficult to bring-
since a court will typically only hear claims of municipal liability once
an underlying constitutional violation by an individual officer has been
established.27 In its 1986 ruling in City of Los Angeles v. Heller the
Court approved trial-court bifurcation of liability in Section 1983 suits,
such that if the jury does not find individual officers as having violated
constitutional rights of the plaintiff, the case will not proceed further;
without an individual violation, the fact that municipal policy or practice
"might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
quite beside the point., 128 That ruling on the order of battle, as between
123 Id. at 106-07; see generally Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguish-
ing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1815, 1819-20 (2000) (noting that
the Lyons Court found no standing to seek an injunction against prospective harm in part be-
cause Lyons had broken the law, which the Court would not assume others would do in the
future).
124 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (urging "restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state of-
ficers engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws"); see also Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (noting that the same federalism concerns that counsel against fed-
eral courts intervening in criminal prosecutions in progress similarly counsel against federal
courts issuing injunctive relief against members of the executive branches of state govern-
ments); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (explaining that federalism concerns
underlie the need for restraint in offering equitable relief against state officers).
125 See, e.g., In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
126 See, e.g., Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (2013); see generally Garrett, supra
note 123, at 1834 (arguing that lower courts distinguish Lyons based on evidence of a group-
based harm such as an equal protection violation).
127 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978).
128 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).
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individuals and municipalities, is far more important than many com-
mentators appreciate. As a result of this bifurcation of Section 1983 liti-
gation, civil rights litigation is presently structured to avoid questions of
policy and training if at all possible, and focuses only on the case-by-
case facts of a particular encounter.
Even if a case does proceed past litigation regarding the individual of-
ficer's actions, it is very difficult to hold a city accountable for a consti-
tutional violation of an officer. The Supreme Court in its 1978 ruling in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, allowed for liability of munici-
palities as "persons" under Section 1983 for constitutional violations.
129
However, showing liability if the city or agency did not have an outright
unconstitutional policy is very difficult. In its 1989 ruling in City of
Canton v. Harris, the Court held that under Section 1983 it must be
shown that training or supervision was "deliberately indifferent" to con-
stitutional rights, such that it was "so obvious" that failure to train or su-
pervise, on a subject "closely related" to the resulting injury, would pre-
dictably produce constitutional violations.
130
Liability of police supervisors is also hard to show-the same "delib-
erate indifference" standard applies.131 The Supreme Court has also
more recently indicated real misunderstanding of how supervisory liabil-
ity in Section 1983 and Bivens'32 litigation is proven. In its ruling re-
garding pleading standards in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a Bivens case filed
against federal officers, the Court rejected the plaintiffs contention that
a supervisor could be liable based on "knowledge and acquiescence in
their subordinates' use of discriminatory criteria to make classification
decisions among detainees," stating instead that "purpose" must be
shown.133 In fact, the Court misstated longstanding law; "deliberate in-
difference" of a supervisor is the standard for supervisory liability, and
129 Monell, 436 U.S. at 701 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989).
131 See, e.g., Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1986); Voutour v. Vitale, 761
F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1985); Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1985).
132 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
133 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (quoting Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at 45-46, Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4734962, at *45-46) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Part of the confusion appeared because of the underlying claim
being an equal protection claim which itself required a showing of discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 676-77.
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"knowledge and acquiescence" could certainly support liability.34 Nor
would police leadership want supervisors to believe that they could
avoid responsibility for constitutional violations by claiming a lack of
"purpose" when they did have actual knowledge of and acquiesced in
the violations.
Individual officer suits, however, also impose high obstacles on relief,
and not just because of the Fourth Amendment doctrine discussed
above, but also because of qualified immunity doctrine. Indeed, during
the same time post-Garner that Supreme Court cases focused on an ob-
jective reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment use-of-force
doctrine, the Court also developed an objective reasonableness doctrine
to insulate all government actors from liability for any type of constitu-
tional claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'35 The
Court rejected a subjective approach with a good faith defense, and in-
stead ruled that officers are immune from suit so long as their conduct
"does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.'' 136 First, this fault stand-
ard protects officers who violated constitutional rights in a way that was
not "unreasonable," and second, it protects officers whose actions were
not "clearly" unconstitutional at the time, based on controlling authority
in the jurisdiction in question or a "consensus of cases of persuasive au-
thority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his ac-
tions were lawful."'37 Some justifications make clear, however, that rea-
sonable official conduct should be informed by what a reasonably well-
trained officer would have done under the circumstances; we discuss this
in Part III, as that case law has the potential to connect official immunity
doctrine to an informed view of police tactics. In addition, qualified im-
munity defenses may be raised early in litigation, interlocutory appeals
on the defense may be raised as an exception to the collateral order doc-
114 E.g., id. at 693-94 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing case law on supervisory liability);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); Diane M. Allen, Liability of Supervisory Of-
ficials and Governmental Entities for Having Failed to Adequately Train, Supervise, or Con-
trol Individual Peace Officers Who Violate Plaintiffs Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 17, 43 (1984).
135 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). For an overview, see John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 94 (1999).
136 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
137 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
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trine,"' and courts may consider qualified immunity of officers before
addressing whether the officers violated the Constitution.13 9 The result
places still greater emphasis on the fault of individual officers, in a high-
ly deferential posture which makes prevailing in Section 1983 litigation
quite difficult, unless a constitutional violation is quite clear and seri-
ous. 
140
By contrast, state law tort causes of action do not share that structure,
where the focus of negligence rules, for example, is on assuring reason-
able care. State intentional tort law typically adopts what amounts to a
negligence standard that immunizes officers for actions that are reasona-
ble and therefore deemed privileged.141 Such rules limiting liability for
assault do not define reasonableness based on any particular moment in
time and, for example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts highlights how
a rule of necessity applies, and deadly force can only be used "when it
reasonably appears" to the officer "that there is no other alternative"
means available short of abandoning the arrest.1 42 In general, the Re-
statement provides that force "is not privileged" if the means used are
"in excess" of that which an actor would "reasonably believe[] to be
necessary.'' 143 Such standards impose a duty of reasonable care con-
sistent with principles of police policy and training that we will describe
in this Article, including concepts of minimization of force, necessity,
and proportionality. Unlike the Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine, state law does not frame the inquiry using a narrow time
period, as the Sections that follow describe.
138 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528-30 (1985); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
U.S. 299, 307-11 (1996) ("[A]n order denying qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on
an 'issue of law,' is immediately appealable." (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S.
at 530)).
139 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). For criticism of the Saucier
rule, see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1249, 1275-81 (2006), and for a defense, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order
of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 115 (2010).
140 For criticism, see David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 23,
67-68 (1989).
141 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 131 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (stating that an arrest is
privileged if under warrant or "the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise
be effected").
142 Id. § 131 cmt. f (noting that deadly force "is privileged only as a last resort").
143 Id. § 132.
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In contrast, the qualified immunity doctrine, the Article III standing
doctrine, and municipal and supervisory liability analyses all place the
primary focus not on policy and training regarding use of force, but on
the individual officer and a case-specific "analysis of the circumstances"
approach.1 4 This constitutional approach is misguided because it focus-
es on the wrong questions. This structure also influenced underlying
Fourth Amendment doctrine, which during the same time period that
this structure developed, began to similarly focus on individual-level of-
ficer action.
D. Investigating Police Uses of Force
The undue focus on an individual conception of reasonableness, apart
from any view of reasonable care or sound policy or tactics, places a
greater focus on the split-second in which force is used. This in turn
magnifies the difficulty in establishing what actually transpired for pur-
poses of liability. Regardless of how the constitutional standard is for-
mulated, excessive-force cases will always be fact dependent to some
extent: A judge or jury will need to examine the force used by the officer
in the context of that particular interaction. The litigants, the judge, or a
fact-finder may have to rely chiefly on the dueling testimony of the of-
ficer and civilian involved.145 Moreover, the civilian may not be alive
144 See, e.g., Jones 'El v. Berge, No. 00-C-421-C, 2001 WL 34379611, at *14 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 14, 2001). For further criticism of this structure, see David Rudovsky, Police Abuse:
Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 465, 501 (1992).
145 Even when the officer and civilian tell very different stories, those stories may never
see the inside of a courtroom. Civilian plaintiffs in excessive-force cases are often criminal
defendants being charged with assaulting or attempting to assault a police officer in the very
incident which they allege involved excessive force. Defending those charges may be the
plaintiffs top priority, not suing under civil rights statutes to obtain compensation or vindi-
cate constitutional rights. If the civilian is convicted of a crime, such as assaulting a police
officer, that conviction may legally or practically bar any civil rights action against law en-
forcement. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding collateral estoppel defense
potentially available in civil rights damages action where federal constitutional claim raised
in criminal suppression hearing). For a summary of the complex law in the area, see Michael
Avery et al., Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation § 9:6 (3d ed. 2000). In other cases, indi-
viduals may not file a complaint or initiate a lawsuit at all, perhaps out of fear for the possi-
ble consequences, disbelief that their complaint will have a positive outcome, aversion to
litigiousness, or desire to put an incident behind them. Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prev-
alence of Abuse of Force, in Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse
of Force 52, 68-70 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (discussing studies that
found between sixty-seven and ninety-seven percent "of excessive force incidents go unre-
ported"); see also Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis-
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and able to dispute the officer's version of events. Courts do recognize
the problem. For example, the Seventh Circuit noted in one case that "a
court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evi-
dence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of
experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be
rejected at a trial. 1 46 And, as the Ninth Circuit put it, a "court may not
simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police of-
ficer." 147 Still, if a civilian or his family decides to bring an excessive-
force suit, how can they ever dispute the officer's version of events (as-
suming the officer does not cheerfully admit to having violated some-
one's constitutional rights)? There may be other evidence, but exactly
what type or types of evidence are available will depend on what type of
use of force was involved and what documentation occurred at the sce-
ne. Eyewitnesses are possible, although potentially even less reliable in
use-of-force cases than in other contexts. Forensic investigation may re-
veal some information, particularly ballistics concerning bullet origins,
paths, and distance; medical evidence related to the severity and causes
of injuries; and evidence of a struggle such as torn clothing. More recent
cases may involve videotape from a police cruiser dash camera, surveil-
lance cameras, or an officer's body-worn camera that captures a force
incident, although even a video may not tell the complete story from all
of the relevant perspectives. 148 Such evidence, and particularly the extent
to which it supports or discredits an officer's account, are of the utmost
importance to determining not just the facts, but also the credibility of
the testifying parties and witnesses.149 After a police shooting or other
use of force it is not necessarily easy to recover what the circumstances
tics, Contacts Between Police and the Public: Findings from the 2002 National Survey 20
(2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp02.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX38-A9ZC]
(finding that eighty-seven percent of people against whom force was used perceived it as
improper or excessive, but less than twenty percent of those persons filed a complaint or ini-
tiated a lawsuit).
146 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994).
147 Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994).
148 For a vivid demonstration of this, using body-camera videos in a series of mock inci-
dents, see Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-
video.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KGE3-9ML3].
141 See, e.g., Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing ballistic
and videotape evidence); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
medical evidence in the record undermines [the officer]'s story in numerous ways."); Ting v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing ballistic evidence).
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were that confronted the police officer-it is even less realistic to expect
judges and jurors to accurately recover what happened in a "split-
second."
II. THE POLICE-TACTICS REVOLUTION
The vast majority of police encounters do not involve the use of force.
In 2008, the most recent year for which data are available, police offic-
ers interacted with individuals nearly 67 million times and used or
threatened to use force in about 1.4% of those encounters.50 Force or
threats of force are more common in traffic stops (4.9%) and street stops
(25.4%).151 Unsurprisingly, officers are more likely to use force against a
person suspected of wrongdoing, 5 2 especially when making an arrest.
1 3
But the low percentages mask high absolute numbers; using the 2008
statistics, officers used force approximately 938,000 times. Although we
lack reliable information about what type of force officers used, we do
know that most police violence involves pushing, grabbing, or hitting
rather than the use of more serious force or a weapon.154 But even if
150 Christine Eith & Matthew R. Durose, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2008, at 6, 12 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM75-ZLC4]. Other studies have found wildly
different numbers. The IACP, for example, found that in 1999, officers used force in 3.61
per 10,000 calls for service, for a rate of 0.0361%. Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Police
Use of Force in America 2001, at i-ii (2001), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/
0/pdfs/Publications/200luseofforce.pdf [https://perma.cc/A658-475J]. A regrettable lack of
standardization makes the different numbers difficult to compare; exactly what definition of
"force" a study adopts and whether it standardizes "calls for service" or officer-civilian en-
counters or the number of sworn officers can dramatically affect the end result. Comparing
data on police force may also allow for the recognition of trends. For example, a 1993 study
by Antony Pate and Lorie Fridell found that officers at large police agencies used force less
often but used deadly force more often than officers at smaller agencies. 1 Antony M. Pate &
Lorie A. Fridell, Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Legal Con-
sequences 4-14-4-16 (1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/146825NCJRS.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9QJM-SFQ6].
15 Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Police Behavior during Traffic and Street Stops, 2011, at 10, 12 (2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtssl 1 .pdf [https://perma.cc/9G8Y-XC72].
t52 Eith & Durose, supra note 150, at 14.
153 As many as one-fifth of arrests require the use of some force. Joel H. Garner & Chris-
topher D. Maxwell, Measuring the Amount of Force Used By and Against the Police in Six
Jurisdictions, in Use of Force by Police: Overview of National and Local Data 25, 39, 41
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice & Bureau of Justice Statistics eds., 1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l/nij/176330-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/67KT-EY9Y].
r54 Eith & Durose, supra note 150, at 12-13.
Tactical Fourth Amendment
"most" police violence is relatively low level, the sheer volume suggests
that there are, every year, many tens of thousands of situations in which
serious, even deadly, force is used. Media outlets such as the Guardi-
an 55 and the Washington Post,'56 and private efforts such as KilledBy-
Police.net,157 offer a count of people who die while interacting with the
police, 58 but as important as such efforts are, they fail to account for us-
es of deadly force that do not result in death.
While media attention has left many with the impression that police
violence has increased in recent years, the opposite is likely true. Ac-
cording to the best information we have-which is far from the best that
we could have-police today use force less frequently than they have
historically.'59 Further, the type of force they use has changed.60 This is
not just a recent phenomenon, and the changes can be traced to the
1960s and 1970s. At the time, the Fourth Amendment did not regulate
the use of force and police departments provided scant training to guide
officers. The "split-second syndrome" may have some basis in historical
practice: Until relatively recently, use-of-force policies and training, if
they existed at all, left it to officers to make last-minute, on-the-spot de-
cisions about whether and how to use force, including deadly force. In-
deed, until the 1970s, "police tactics" meant the techniques that officers
used to subdue and restrain individuals. The notion that tactics could en-
compass practices that allow officers to avoid or minimize the need to
use force was poorly developed.
All of this would quickly change. During the very time period that the
Supreme Court adopted its unduly individualized approach toward po-
lice use of force, policing researchers discovered systematic approaches
that could minimize and avoid the need to use force. The modem re-
155 The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-
killings-us-database.
156 Fatal Force, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-
shootings-2016/ [https://perma.cc/WRY4-PUYH].
157 Killed by Police 2016, http://killedbypolice.net/ [https://perma.cc/G8BD-HAS6].
158 For an argument that such counts are overinclusive because they include individuals
who would have died regardless of any interaction with the police, see Nick Selby et al., In
Context: Understanding Police Killings of Unarmed Civilians 7 (2016).
159 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, officers used or threatened force in about
1.5% of encounters in 2002. Durose et al., supra note 145, at iv-v.
160 Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, supra note 150, at ii (showing an increase in the ratio of




search on police tactics, as well as the realization that better procedures
could improve the safety of officers and civilians alike, can be traced to
the early work of Fyfe, a lieutenant with the New York City Police De-
partment ("NYPD") who earned a Ph.D. in the 1970s.
161
A. Early Police-Tactics Research
Fyfe's early work, and that of others by the 1970s, prefigured a sea
change in the scholarship surrounding police practices and use of force.
The Garner decision by the Supreme Court, as the opinion itself makes
clear, was informed by a preexisting and then-growing body of research
and best practices. A central theme of that body of work was that police
officers are not members of "a near-supernatural profession who rely
more upon art and instinct than upon systematic knowledge, and whose
work is an unending series of instant life-or-death decisions.' 62 Instead,
careful use-of-force policies, police tactics and training, and strong su-
pervision and investigation was required to minimize use of force and
protect officer safety.
Through the early 1970s, it was rare for police departments to have
any written policy on the use of force. Instead, many departments relied
on "oral policy. ' 163 Leading policing texts said nothing about deadly
force, and officers described a "Wild West" and "open season" mentali-
ty toward using weapons, one in which warning shots could be fired and
fleeing-felony suspects, such as Edward Garner, could be shot.
164
A seminal work during that time period was Fyfe's dissertation exam-
ining all shooting incidents in New York City over a five-year period,
from 1971 through 1975. This work included a remarkable dataset of
3,573 distinct instances-involving 4,904 officers, and 2,926 "shooting
incidents"-of police firearm discharges and assaults on police by per-
sons who were either armed with deadly weapons or inflicted serious
physical injury.1 65 This was an important time to be doing this research.
Nationally, far more officers were being killed every year than had pre-
161 For a classic overview, see Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Po-
lice and the Excessive Use of Force xvi-xviii (1993).
162 Fyfe, Police Expert Witnesses, supra note 68, at 101.
163 Samuel Walker, The New World of Police Accountability 41 (2005).
164 Id. at 42.
165 James Joseph Fyfe, Shots Fired: An Examination of New York City Police Firearms
Discharges 55 (Apr. 1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany).
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viously been the case.66 Fyfe's research was built, in part, on the intui-
tion that officers could be trained to respond in a way that reduced the
danger they faced.167 That, in turn, could reduce the need for officers to
use lethal force in response to that danger. In 1972, the NYPD had
adopted an influential first-time written policy on deadly force (one
which abandoned a fleeing-felon rule).
The results of Fyfe's research were groundbreaking. He identified
robberies as giving rise to the most shootings in New York City.168 He
also found that looking at the number of shots fired, a common practice
at the time, was not a useful metric. Fyfe described how relying on
number of shots fired "is likely to generate faulty conclusions," largely
because some "spectacular incidents" can involve confrontations with
suspects "who remained a threat despite being shot many times.
' ' 69
Some people who pose deadly threats to police "won't go down."'
170
Fyfe's report noted that some officers were force prone, and that the de-
partment had formerly tended "to look the other way," but had since
started to create early-warning systems to identify such officers.171 Fyfe
also explored the problem of shootings by off-duty officers, who were
required by policy to carry their weapons at all times. He questioned
whether requiring officers to carry weapons while off duty was a good
idea, given the deadly encounters that so frequently resulted.172 Addi-
tionally, Fyfe asked whether there could not be some compromise be-
166 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Table 47 Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed:
Race and Sex of Known Offender, 2005-2014, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
ucr/leoka/2014/tables/table_47_leos fk race and sex of known offender_2005-2014.xls
[https://perma.cc/77UP-DLGL]. In the ten-year period ending in 1970, for example, 63.3
officers were feloniously killed on average every year. That number almost doubled in the
ten-year period ending in 1980, growing to an annual average of 114.8 officers feloniously
killed. Univ. of Albany, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics Online tbl. 3.154.2012, http://w*,w.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t31542012.pdf [https://perma.cc/32WQ-YAC3].
167 Police Organization and Training: Innovations in Research and Practice 159 (M.R.
Haberfeld et al. eds., 2012) (quoting an interview in which Fyfe said that: "[T]he goal of the
training is to teach officers to approach the situation in such a way that their protective task
is maximised while their exposure to danger in minimised. This has to be done especially by
restructuring the situation in such a way that shooting becomes less likely." (citing F.P.C.M.
de Jong & J.G.B. Mensink, Sharp or Not Sharp...; an Investigation into the Use of a Shooting
Simulator (1994))).
168 Fyfe, Shots Fired, supra note 165, at 500.
169 Id. at 257.
170 Id. at 258.
171 Id. at 248, 251.
172 Id. at 507.
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tween "the nightstick and the revolver," an intermediate level of force
that would allow officers to more effectively "stop[] without killing. 173
In a follow-up study, Fyfe found that "a considerable reduction in the
frequency of police shooting accompanied New York City's direct in-
tervention on the firearms discretion of its police officers" and the adop-
tion of the new and more restrictive use-of-force policies in 1972.114
These reductions occurred in "the most controversial shooting incidents:
shootings to prevent or terminate crimes."' 7 5 At the same time, "these
shooting decreases were not accompanied by increased officer injury or
death.,1 76 This suggested that the connection between use-of-force poli-
cies and the actual use of force was stronger than may have been previ-
ously estimated, while the connection between the use of deadly force
and officer safety was weaker.
1 77
What Fyfe's research and research by others during that time period
showed can be summarized as follows: (1) there is "extreme variation"
in rates of police shooting across jurisdictions; (2) shootings dispropor-
tionately involve black victims, but are also associated with community
violence and arrest rates; and (3) organizational factors regarding police
policies, training, and police chief priorities may affect police shoot-
ings. 178
Based on that research, Fyfe recommended, in the article that was cit-
ed in Garner, that:
1. Police departments should institute clear policy guidelines to
limit the use of deadly force.
2. Policy guidelines should be related to the dangerousness of
suspects, and should prohibit use of deadly force to apprehend
nonviolent suspects. 179
173 Id. at 518.
174 James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empiri-
cal Examination, 7 J. Crim. Just. 309, 322 (1979), reprinted in Readings on Police Use of
Deadly Force 258, 277 (James J. Fyfe ed., 1982).




177 Id. at 277-79.
178 James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 707 , 707-08 (1982).
79 Fyfe, Observations, supra note 68, at 388.
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Eleven more recommendations delved far more deeply into the re-
view, investigation, and internal adjudication of police shootings; solicit-
ing citizen complaints; responsibility of field supervisors; and training
programs.1 80 The recommendations further discussed using policies and
practices to reduce "the potential for police-citizen violence" and pro-
posed rethinking rewards for officers and the "quantitative measures of
police work., 18 These recommendations were fairly straightforward, but
they proved to be highly influential, and they came at a time when police
agencies were professionalizing their procedures. Far more agencies
adopted written policies on use of force in the years that followed. 18 2
B. Current Police Use-of-Force Policies
What guides the decision when and whether to use force? To this day,
the data collection on police use of force itself remains highly incom-
plete. 1 83 While some police technology has dramatically changed just in
the past decade, the approach toward police tactics has remained fairly
stable since the 1980s, with some notable exceptions.184 The tactical
revolution resulted in the development of policies and training, both of
which are now ubiquitous, to guide police use of force. In 2000, the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics estimated that well over 93% of police agencies
had policies governing the use of deadly force and 87% had policies for
nonlethal force.8 5 Sound policies concerning use of force are necessary
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Matthew J. Hickman & Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Local Police Departments 2000, at iv (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/lpdOO.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJQ-6953].
183 Fyfe, Too Many Missing Cases, supra note 25, at 99 (discussing the continuing lack of
good data on police use of force); Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Policing and Homicide, 1976-98: Justifiable Homicide by
Police, Police Officers Murdered by Felons 28-30 (2001) (describing Supplemental Homi-
cide Reports statistics).
184 Police tactics have shifted dramatically in the context of active-shooter response, for
example, and agencies across the country have increased the use of dynamic "no-knock"
raids and the deployment of specialized SWAT-style units to execute drug-related search and
arrest warrants. Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Po-
lice Forces 172 (2013); Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian
Officers, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 611, 643 (2016).
185 Hickman & Reaves, supra note 182, at iv.
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but far from sufficient, since written practices must be implemented, and
in particular, officers must be trained to react in difficult situations using
techniques that cannot be concisely reduced to policy.
8 6
Dating back to and before the seminal research and policy changes in
the 1970s, police trainers have emphasized the importance of training
and policy where many features of officers' decisions are not intuitive
and cannot be expected to be made carefully for the first time while the
officer reacts to an encounter.187 Training is a necessary supplement to
policy, and there is insufficient room in a single article--or even a single
volume-to discuss every aspect and nuance of tactics training. In this
Part, we provide an overview of the foundational concepts that police
tactics are built upon, as well as a brief review of some of the more
salient features of tactical training. Much of the training on the use of
force takes place at the police academy, where most local officers re-
ceive their initial police education. As of 2013, the most recent year for
which data are available, about 45,000 police recruits enrolled in, and
about 38,600 graduated from, one of the more than 650 police acade-
mies scattered across the country, where they received an average of 840
hours of training.1 88 A significant portion of that training focuses on the
four high-liability areas: firearms, combatives,189 driving, and first
186 Unfortunately, there are ample reasons to believe that written policies are neither re-
flective nor directive of actual practice. See Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of
Policing, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2179, 2213-14 (2014).
187 See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Uses of Force ch. 2 (forthcoming); see also IACP
National Consensus Policy on Use of Force, supra note 1, at 4 (describing need for annual
training on agency use-of-force policy and "regular and periodic training" on techniques
such as de-escalation and use of less-lethal force). To the extent that tactics have found their
way into policy at all, they have long been treated separately from the use of force. However,
the two have been connected in police practices research and in police training, and increas-
ingly, the two have been connected in the more detailed and up-to-date use-of-force policies,
as described. Indeed, some of the same policies that minimize the need to use force are de-
signed to minimize dangers to officers: An officer who is in less danger has less need to use
force to address that danger.
188 Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State and Local
Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2013, at 1, 4 (2016) [hereinafter State and Local
Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2013], https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
slletal3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG3L-PTPN].
189 We use "combatives" to refer to officers' use of physical force. Although not unheard
of, the word "combatives" is typically disfavored by law enforcement, which most often uses
the phrase "defensive tactics." Though more frequently used, that term erroneously suggests
that the training is focused on officers defending themselves or others from attack. Some po-
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aid.190 Only very rarely does an academy omit training in firearms, pro-
vided by 98% of academies, and combatives, provided by 99% of acad-
emies.1 91 Not only are these topics of instruction common, they are also
what "[r]ecruits spen[d] the most time learning," with an average of 60
hours dedicated to firearms and 63 hours to combatives-each one more
than any other single block of training.192 These numbers have not
changed substantially since 2002, when the vast majority of academies
required an average of 60 hours of training in firearms and 56 hours in
combatives.193 Although systematic data are not available, this training
often continues when a candidate graduates from the academy and be-
gins working for a police department that has its own policy or policies
governing the use of force.
Nevertheless, training on tactics remains inadequate. The large blocks
of time police academies dedicate to firearms and combatives training
stand in sharp contrast to the relative paucity of training in the
knowledge and skills officers need to effectively utilize nonviolent
methods of conflict resolution. Recall that upward of 98% of police
academies provide, on average, more than 120 hours of lethal and less-
lethal force training.194 In contrast, in 2013, 95% of academies offered
an average of only 12 hours of training in "[c]ultural diversity/human re-
lations."'1 95 Even fewer academies provided training in basic community
policing strategies, with 82% of academies spending an average of only
10 hours on that topic.196 And a similarly small number--only 82% of
lice training is legitimately defensive in that sense, of course, but the majority focuses on the
use of aggressive force to apprehend and handcuff a suspect who is either complying or non-
violently resisting. In this way, combatives training mirrors the way that officers actually use
force: "The vast majority of the time ... officers use force aggressively, not defensively."
Stoughton, supra note 92, at 868.
190 Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State and Local
Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2006, at 6 (2009) [hereinafter State and Local Law




193 Matthew J. Hickman, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State and Lo-
cal Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2002, at 9 (2005) [hereinafter State and Local
Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2002], http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
slleta02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7LE-C69U].
194 See State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2006, supra note 188, at 6.




academies-provided any training at all in "[m]ediation skills/conflict
management."'97 Those that did provided an average of 9 hours.'
98 That
number is lower than the 88% of academies that provided an average of
8 hours of mediation/conflict management raining in 2006 and the 83%
that offered an average of 8 hours of training in 2002.'99 Further, where a
substantial majority of firearms and combatives training is experien-
tial--officers handle and shoot firearms at a range and they learn com-
batives by practicing them on one another or on an instructor wearing
protective gear-a substantial portion of conflict resolution and de-
escalation training is provided through lecture-based, classroom instruc-
tion. This has proven problematic; a traditional, lecture-based classroom
environment is not conducive to teaching physical and mental skills of-
ficers must apply in real-world settings.°°
C. An Introduction to Police Tactics
Modem police tactics, while addressing a wide range of situations
that police must encounter, all have a common goal: managing risk. In
the use-of-force context, tactics are the techniques and procedures that
officers use to balance the relative risks to themselves and civilians in
any given situation so that they can handle encounters as safely as cir-
cumstances permit. Some of the techniques officers employ are in-
formed by empirical research, and some require more research in order
to validate their use. Far more work must be done to empirically exam-
ine police tactics and policing more generally. We do not mean to sug-
gest that particular types of police tactics have been empirically validat-
ed as best practices. What we do argue is that the use of tactics to reduce
overall risk, thereby minimizing or avoiding the use of force, is far pref-
erable to an approach that permits or encourages officers to react in the
moment. We hope that further research will lead to the continued re-
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2006, supra note 190, at 1, 6;
State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2002, supra note 193, at 9.
200 Zuchel v. City & Cty. of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 739 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting expert tes-
timony concluding that training films are viewed "quite often as video games" and that field
exercises and "role-play situations ... are much more effective"); Mark R. McCoy, Teach-
ing Style and the Application of Adult Learning Principles by Police Instructors, 29 Policing:
Int'l J. Police Strategies & Mgmt. 77, 89 (2006); Richard B. Weinblatt, New Police Training




finement of existing tactics and the development of new tactics that can
safely minimize the use of force.
Tactical procedures are informed by the observation that officer deci-
sion making suffers in highly stressful situations. Even the best-trained
officers may have bad judgment when they are forced to make truly
split-second decisions, in large part because they lack the time to con-
sider alternative approaches. For that reason, time is a foundational con-
cept that underlies modern police tactics. With time, officers are better
able to make accurate risk assessments, consider the range of appropri-
ate tactical options, and take actions that can minimize or avoid the use
of force altogether. In the following Subsections, we explore time as a
tactical concept, the tactics that officers use operationally to create time,
and the techniques that officers can employ in the time that they cre-
ate.
2" 1
1. Decision Time as a Tactical Concept
Time is a central concept in police tactics, affecting as it does the ac-
curacy of officers' perceptions and the quality of decision making. The
Court suggested as much in Graham v. Connor, emphasizing that the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness tandard must accommodate the
"split-second" nature of officers' use-of-force decisions.22 Unsurpris-
ingly, police tactics often seek to "create" time in which officers can as-
sess or respond to the situation, either by maintaining distance or by in-
troducing obstacles that make it more difficult for threats to reach
201 We note, as a threshold matter, that reliable information about police training is notori-
ously difficult to come by. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empiri-
cal Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 662-63 (describing the dif-
ficulty of obtaining information about how officers are trained to conduct searches). Police
training is provided through a mix of lectures and experiential learning, with minimal em-
phasis on written materials. This section draws from what materials are available, primarily
books and articles directed at an audience consisting of law police professionals. The diffi-
culty of relying on such materials comes from the fact that, by and large, they are not intend-
ed to be introductory. Indeed, they often assume that readers will already be familiar with the
concepts we introduce here.
112 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); see also IACP National Consensus Policy on Use of Force,
supra note 1, at 4 ("Whenever possible and when such delay will not compromise the safety
of the officer or another and will not result in the destruction of evidence, escape of a sus-
pect, or commission of a crime, an officer shall allow an individual time and opportunity to
submit to verbal commands before force is used.").
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them.20 3 Creating time in this way benefits officers, as two separate con-
ceptions of human decision making-the (1) Observation, Orientation,
Decision, and Action ("OODA") Loop and (2) System 1/System 2 think-
ing-suggest. Much of modem law enforcement tactics are designed
around a simplified model of human reaction known as the OODA
Loop.204 Under this model, any individual-including both officers and
suspects-can physically react to a situation only after going through
four distinct phases: Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action.0 5
Observation involves gathering sensory information about the world; for
example, an officer sees someone reaching into a pocket, hears a gun-
shot, or feels an arrestee pull away from them. This information is pro-
cessed in the Orientation phase, during which the individual puts her ob-
servations into context and draws conclusions about the situation.206 The
person reaching into her pocket may be reaching for her keys so she can
unlock her car, or for a weapon so that she can attack the officer, for ex-
ample. The Orientation phase of the OODA Loop is when the officer
applies preexisting mental models to determine the relative likelihood of
203 Police Exec. Research Forum, Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force 40-41
(2015), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtrainingl.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C9T6-2CPU]; Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policies 16, 17, 20; Urban All.
on Race Relations, Saving Lives: Alternatives to the Use of Lethal Force by Police 7 (2000),
https://urbanalliance.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/savinglivesreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YZN9-CHSN].
204 The OODA Loop was originally posited by Colonel John Boyd, an Air Force pilot
whose theories and strategies enabled the pilots he trained to consistently out-fly the techno-
logically superior enemy aircraft. Tracy A. Hightower, Boyd's O.O.D.A. Loop and How We
Use It, Tactical Response Blog (Oct. 20, 2016, 3:20 PM) https://tacticalresponse.com/
blogs/library/18649427-boyd-s-o-o-d-a-loop-and-how-we-use-it [https://perma.cc/Z3JX-
WVVQ]; see also J. Pete Blair & M. Hunter Martaindale, Evaluating Police Tactics: An
Empirical Assessment of Room Entry Techniques 41 (Joycelyn M. Pollock & Michael C.
Braswell eds., 2014) ("In the tactical world, [decision making] is often explained using
Boyd's Cycle [another name for the OODA Loop]"); Tomas C. Mijares & Ronald M.
McCarthy, Significant Tactical Police Cases: Learning from Past Events to Improve upon
Future Responses 14 (2015) (describing the OODA Loop as having been "extrapolated [from
the military context] for use in other environments ranging from business management to
close quarter combat"); Amaury Murgado, Why the OODA Loop is Still Relevant, Police: L.
Enforcement Mag. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/careers-
training/articles/2013/01/why-the-ooda-loop-is-still-relevant.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JFB-
LTDU] ("Every law enforcement officer needs to understand the OODA loop because it ex-
plains how people act and react in a demanding, evolving, and highly charged situation. This
decision-making model can be used to deconstruct verbal and physical confrontations.").
205 Hightower, supra note 204.
206 Id.
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each possibility.2 °7 During the Decision phase, the officer selects from
among the range of alternative responses to the perceived situation.2 8
That response is put into motion during the Action phase.20 9 The OODA
Loop is both continuous and overlapping-officers and civilians alike
are constantly taking in new information, processing that information,
making decisions on the basis of that processing, and implementing
those decisions.210 Efficiency and accuracy are both viewed as essential;
as police training emphasizes, action is faster than reaction.2 1 By being
the first one to put a decision into action, the officer can "reset" or "re-
boot" a suspect's OODA Loop by forcing the suspect to react to new in-
formation (the officer's action).212 Police tactics encourage officers to
put themselves into positions of relative tactical advantage, which pro-
207 Donald A. MacCuish, Orientation: Key to the OODA Loop-The Culture Factor, 3 J.
Def. Resources Mgmt. 67, 70 (2012).208 Hightower, supra note 204.
209 Id.
210 MacCuish, supra note 207, at 67.
21 See, e.g., Charles Remsberg, Rethinking Reaction Time, Police: L. Enforcement Mag.
(Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2004/12/officer-
survival.aspx [httpS://perma.cc/5CU6-665N]. The common-sense concept that response fol-
lows stimulus is channeled into police training in the form of the "reactionary gap," a phrase
introduced by Charles Remsberg in the 1980s to refer to amount of time an officer needs to
become aware of and react to any given threat. Charles Remsberg, The Tactical Edge: Sur-
viving High-Risk Patrol 437, 440 (1986) [hereinafter Remsberg, Tactical Edge] (emphasis
omitted); see also Amaury Murgado, Closing the Gap, Police: L. Enforcement Mag. (July
10, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/careers-training/articles/2013/07/closing-the-
gap.aspx [https://perma.cc/5AWC-FFWX] (using "reactionary gap" to refer to the distance
that must be maintained between an officer and suspect in order to give the officer sufficient
time to react). The reactionary gap was popularized by John Tueller, who created a drill de-
signed to show officers that a suspect with an edged weapon could attack an officer twenty-
one feet away before the officer could respond with lethal force, giving rise to what became
known as the "21-foot rule." Ron Martinelli, Revisiting the "21-Foot Rule," Police: L. En-
forcement Mag. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.policemag.com/channel/weapons/articles/
2014/09/revisiting-the-21-foot-rule.aspx [https://perma.cc/TSB8-2JFA]. This "rule" was
never intended to be a definitive measure of the reactionary gap in the edged weapons con-
text; it was intended as an illustration of the reactionary gap to demonstrate to officers that
the suspect's action was faster than their reaction. Id.
212 The concept of "rebooting" or "resetting" the OODA Loop process is common in law
enforcement. See, e.g., Hightower, supra note 204 ("Making sure our students understand the
O.O.D.A. Loop and how we react as humans can go a long way toward accomplishing that
goal. The really great thing about understanding the O.O.D.A. Loop is the realization that
everybody has one and their O.O.D.A. Loop is affected by the same factors that yours is.
This is one of the reasons why in nearly every drill we teach it incorporates moving. This has
the effect of resetting your opponent's O.O.D.A. Loop and giving you still another ad-
vantage.").
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vide more time for, and thus improve the quality of, every step in the
OODA Loop process.
The OODA Loop provides a foundational understanding of modem
police tactics, but research from cognitive psychology and neuroscience
also offer useful insights. Professor Daniel Kahneman popularized a du-
al-process theory of human thought, categorizing cognition into "System
1" and "System 2" thinking.1 3 System 1 thinking is fast, and it is fast
because it is subconscious; primitive, reflexive assessments and re-
sponses to sudden stimuli are examples of System 1 thinking. System 2
thinking, by contrast, is slower because it requires conscious delibera-
tion; contemplation or the use of logic are examples of System 2 think-
ing.214 If, for example, a red-faced stranger were aggressively to scream
a math problem at you, your perception of him as angry would be the re-
sult of System 1, while actually solving the math problem would require
System 2.215 As this example suggests, the different systems may be
preferable in different types of situations. In some circumstances, a
quick System 1 reaction based on the gist of the situation may be prefer-
able; indeed, Kahneman suggests that System 1 serves an evolutionary
function by decreasing our reaction time in threatening situations.
2 16 Po-
lice tactics can decrease the need to use System 1 thinking in officer-
civilian encounters; by reducing immediate threats to the officer, tactics
create more opportunities for officers to engage in System 2 thinking.
Given the life and death stakes, a deliberate decision to use force is pref-
erable, if it can be reached safely.
Further, System 1 reactions pose special problems in the use-of-force
context. Substantial research suggests that, while moderate levels of
stress may enhance sensory perception and attention, people faced with
more serious perceived or actual physical threats, particularly deadly
threats, may experience stress reactions that make sound decision mak-
ing far more challenging.21 7 Responses colloquially called "flight or
213 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 20 (2011).
214 Id. at 21; see also Gideon Keren & Yaacov Schul, Two Is Not Always Better than One:
A Critical Evaluation of Two-System Theories, 4 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 533, 546 (2009)
(discussing the role of both systems in problem solving).
215 Kahneman, supra note 213, at 19-20.
216 Id. at 301.
217 See, e.g., William R. Lovallo, Stress and Health: Biological and Psychological Interac-
tions 89-98 (2d ed. 2005); Raffael Kalisch et al., A Conceptual Framework for the Neurobi-
ological Study of Resilience, Behav. & Brain Sci. 1, 3 (2015).
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fight" can result.218 This response can be an effective System 1 reaction,
a biological response designed to ensure safety of an individual, but it
does not necessarily comport with law enforcement goals to protect the
public and minimize loss of life or injury, both to officers and the public.
This is particularly true in light of the cognitive challenges associated
with high-stress environments. Officers may have distorted sensory per-
ceptions, including visual distortions (e.g., "tunnel vision"), auditory
distortions (e.g., "auditory blunting"), and distortions in how time is
perceived (perceiving events as moving more quickly or more slowly
than they actually are);2 19 cognitive impairments, such as slowed reac-
tion time; and physiological deficiencies, including a reduction in manu-
al dexterity and motor skills.220 In light of the heavy, if not exclusive, re-
liance on System 1 thinking in dangerous environments, police tactics
can create space for System 2 thinking by reducing the risk to the of-
ficer. By providing more time for officers to both gather and process in-
formation before responding, police tactics serve to improve the quality
of decision making.22' Whether one analyzes them under the rubric of
the OODA Loop or System /System 2 thinking, police tactics seek to
maximize the amount of time an officer has to assess the situation, make
an informed decision, and implement a response.2 2 The narrow, "split-
218 Kalisch et al., supra note 217, at 3.
219 David A. Klinger & Rod K. Brunson, Police Officers' Perceptual Distortions During
Lethal Force Situations: Informing the Reasonableness Standard, 8 Criminology & Pub.
Pol'y 117, 123 (2009); see also Dean T. Olson, Improving Deadly Force Decision Making,
67 FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 1, 7 (1998) (discussing "the deterioration of fine and complex
motor skills under survival stress"); Bobby Westmoreland & Billy D. Haddock, Code "3"
Driving: Psychological and Physiological Stress Effects, 37 Law & Ord. 29, 30 (1989) (de-
scribing how the stress of an emergency can lead to tunnel vision); Seth D. DuCharme, Note,
The Search for Reasonableness in Use-of-Force Cases: Understanding the Effects of Stress
on Perception and Performance, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2515, 2541-42 (2002) (explaining
three categories of distorted sensory perception).
220 Judith P. Andersen & Harri Gustafsberg, A Training Method to Improve Police Use of
Force Decision Making: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 6 SAGE Open 1, 2-3 (2016),
http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/6/2/2158244016638708 [https://perma.cc/X8EP-38NC];
DuCharme, supra note 219, at 2546-48.
221 See generally Gerd Gigerenzer, Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World
107-39 (2015) (exploring methods for enabling rational decision making through heuristics).
222 Although most police tactics seek to maximize the amount of time that an officer has to
assess and respond to the situation, some tactics rely on restricting the amount of time a sus-
pect has to do the same thing. No-knock warrants, for example, are often executed using
"dynamic entry" tactics, in which officers rapidly enter a location "using specialized batter-
ing rams or entry explosives," potentially including the use of "flash-bang grenades designed
to temporarily disorient the occupants." The Encyclopedia of Police Science 792 (Jack R.
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second" frame under which use-of-force decisions are analyzed is not
only inapposite, it stands in tension with the conceptual foundation of
police tactics. In the following Subsections, we discuss tactical proce-
dures that officers use to create time and the techniques that take ad-
vantage of that time to reduce the potential need for force. As a thresh-
old matter, we acknowledge the somewhat artificial dichotomy in our
presentation: Rather than falling neatly in one category or the other,
some tactics are intended to both create time and minimize resistance.
Nevertheless, thinking about tactics along those dimensions-creating
time and minimizing force-provides a useful framework for under-
standing police operations.
2. Creating Decision Time
Tactical Approach. Officers can reduce the amount of time they
need to make decisions in the moment by making those decisions-to
the extent possible-ahead of time or by restricting ex ante the need to
make certain decisions altogether. Officers are taught "to make tactical
thinking a constant part of their working lives by considering, as they
approach each encounter, their response to possible resistance.'' 23 Such
training is aimed at increasing the speed with which officers can respond
to resistance when it manifests, effectively packing better decision mak-
ing into the same amount of time. Similarly, officers are taught to posi-
tion their bodies in a way that allows them to respond quickly to
threats-keeping their arms uncrossed and hands out of their pockets,
Greene ed., 3d ed. 2007). A dynamic entry involves officers "go[ing] in hard and fast, rely-
ing on speed, surprise and radical tactics" that are intended to create a situation in which,
from the suspect's perspective, "one second there is nothing happening and the next all hell
breaks loose." Remsberg, Tactical Edge, supra note 211, at 229. The goal is not to maximize
the time officers have to make decisions, but rather to deny the occupants the time they need
to properly assess the situation and mount any effective resistance. Charles "Sid" Heal,
Sound Doctrine: A Tactical Primer 79 (2000) (observing that because people "are handi-
capped by an inability to instantly process and react to a new stimulus, surprise deprives a
suspect of the ability to react to new circumstances effectively").
The potential for mistakes inherent in a time-pressured environment makes dynamic entry
"infinitely more dangerous" than other entry tactics, and its use is accordingly "very lim-
ited." Remsberg, Tactical Edge, supra note 211, at 237 (emphasis omitted). There are, unfor-
tunately, a number of examples where a dynamic entry had tragic results. See Radley Balko,
Cato Inst., Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America 2-4 (2006) (docu-
menting examples).
223 Stoughton, supra note 92, at 865.
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for example-and that makes it more difficult for a suspect to attack
them.224
Additionally, "[a]n officer will take steps to control a scene well be-
fore they [sic] initiate contact with someone" by, for example, not initi-
ating a traffic stop or a pedestrian encounter until the environment fa-
vors the officer,225 or by building in a buffer in which they can assess
and act without being time pressured. For example, officers responding
to an address typically park down the block; doing so not only reduces
the opportunity to ambush officers in their vehicles, but it also gives of-
ficers additional time in which to gather information about a scene be-
fore they begin interacting with civilians.
226
Further, an officer's tactical approach can effectively restrict the
range of future decisions that must be made. In other words, a decision
made early in an encounter, or even before an encounter begins, when
there is no time pressure can avoid putting officers into a position where
they have to make a time-pressured decision. "[Officer]-
created.., jeopardy," on the other hand, refers to a dangerous situation
into which an officer unnecessarily puts himself.227 A poor tactical deci-
sion, such as stepping in front of a moving vehicle, can deprive the of-
ficer of time in which to safely make a decision about how to act, forc-
ing the officer to make a seat-of-the-pants decision about how to
respond. Similarly, a good tactical approach can restrict the potential
threats that officers have to address, leaving them more time to focus on
those that remain. By approaching the passenger side of a stopped vehi-
cle, for example, officers reduce or eliminate the need to think about
224 See id. at 866; Patrol Tip: The Interview Stance, Sentinel Handbook Blog (May 11,
2013, 10:50 PM), https:/sentinelhandbook.wordpress.com/2013/05/1 1 patrol-tip-the-
interview-stance/ [https://perma.cc/QHY8-5ZPF] ("Hands should be held above waist level
to speed your reaction time, using the non-dominant hand to gesture if necessary. Keep
hands relaxed and open, preferably without anything held in them to allow instant reaction.
Never hook a thumb in your belt, or pocket!"). By taking a "bladed" stance, standing at a
slight angle with the officer's holster-side leg back a little bit, and keeping hands a few inch-
es away from the body and above the belly button, the officer keeps his firearm out of the
suspect's reach and positions his own arms so that they can be quickly used defensively or
aggressively. Richard Nance, Tactical Footwork, Officer.com (Sept. 20, 2007),
http://www.officer.com/article/10249461/tactical-footwork [https://perma.cc/9AQV-NGY5]
(click through images of stances to sixth picture).
225 Stoughton, supra note 92, at 866.
226 Id. (describing officers' tactical maneuvering before initiating contact with a civilian).
227 Jeffrey J. Noble & Geoffrey P. Alpert, State-Created Danger: Should Police Officers
Be Accountable for Reckless Tactical Decision Making?, in Critical Issues in Policing: Con-
temporary Readings 481, 493 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 6th ed. 2010).
2017]
260 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:211
passing traffic as a potential threat should the driver offer some re-
sistance. In the same vein, two officers interacting with a driver or pe-
destrian will take on the roles of a "contact" officer, who interacts with
the civilian, and a "cover" officer, who takes up a tactically advanta-
geous position-such as in an "L"-with one officer in front of the pe-
destrian and the other off to one side.2 8 Such positioning gives officers
time-related advantages over the suspect; officers can see each other in a
way that improves communication while ensuring that the suspect can
only pay attention to one of them at a time, and officers are also out of
each other's line of fire, reducing the amount of time they need to de-
ploy deadly force, should it become necessary.229
Distance. The closer an officer is to danger, the less time she has to
assess the situation and respond to that danger. By increasing the dis-
tance between themselves and a potential threat, officers can create time
in which to make and implement informed decisions. There is no way to
establish, ex ante, any clear rules about "safe" or "safer" distances; as a
tactical concept, distance must be operationalized in a way that accounts
for the nature of the threat and the officer's actions at the time. 3° For
example, a man with a knife is less dangerous to officers who are thirty
feet away than he is to officers who are five feet away. Similarly, a man
with a knife is less dangerous to officers who are already aware of the
knife and have taken steps to minimize the amount of time they would
need to respond to aggression, such as drawing their firearms. The fail-
ure to create or use distance can deprive officers of the time they need to
continually assess the situation, take protective actions, and respond ap-
propriately to changes in the risk they face. The shooting of Tamir Rice,
discussed in the introduction, is a sad example of a use of force that
could have been avoided with distance. The officer who ultimately shot
Rice exited a patrol car that had been parked-by a second officer-in
228 See generally Steven Albrecht & John Morrison, Contact & Cover: Two-Officer Sus-
pect Control 23 (1992) (discussing the role of the cover officer); Contact & Cover, Law Of-
ficer, (Oct. 1, 2009), http://lawofficer.com/archive/contact-cover/ [https://perma.cc/X4TY-
GB99] (same).
229 While such tactics provide a time-related advantage, it is important to note that they
may hinder trust-building efforts. Our discussion here is limited to the safety and decision-
making implications of police tactics; we do not address the tension that can exist between
officer safety and police legitimacy.
230 See Dave Grossi, The Reactionary Gap: Reminders on Threats and Distances, Police-
One.com (June 3, 2013), https://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/articles/6258834-The-
reactionary-gap-Reminders-on-threats-and-distances/ [https://perma.cc/FMW5-D9XS].
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close proximity to a suspect whom officers had been told had threatened
passers-by with a handgun.23 ' That officer had no opportunity to assess
the situation from a position of relative safety; he was thrust into exactly
the type of split-second decision making that good tactics seek to avoid.
The result is as unsurprising as it is tragic, and it almost certainly would
have been different had the officers parked a block away.
Cover & Concealment. As officers approach a situation, particularly
a potentially dangerous situation, they are taught to use cover and con-
cealment. "Cover" refers to a physical obstacle that protects an officer
from a particular threat.232 For example, a concrete wall or an engine
block provides cover from small-caliber handgun fire. "Concealment"
refers to an obstacle that breaks the suspect's line of sight to the officer,
hiding the officer from view, but that is not necessarily sufficient to
physically obstruct the threat itself.233 Thus, a car door offers conceal-
ment, but not cover from handgun fire. Whether a particular obstacle
provides cover or concealment is context specific; the same car door that
provides concealment from handgun fire also provides cover from a
thrown knife. Cover and concealment are tactical concepts because they
reduce the immediate risk to officers, which means that officers have
more time to analyze a situation and act appropriately. When an officer
can, for example, assess the scene and give commands from relative
safety-behind cover or concealment-then the officer need not resort
to deadly force immediately to prevent the suspect from accessing or us-
ing a weapon.
As an officer approaches any given situation, he is taught to use envi-
ronmental factors to maximize his own safety, to look for and think
about how best to use cover and concealment. Officers learn to physical-
ly position themselves in a tactically-advantageous way.234 For example,
231 See Crawford Report, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
232 This is not "cover" in the sense of obtaining backup from other officers; "contact and
cover" refers instead to having a backup officer assist with operational safety. Albrecht &
Morrison, supra note 228, at 22.
233 Mike "Ziggy" Siegfried, Video: Cars, Cover, and Concealment, Police: L. Enforcement
Mag. (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/201 1/10/cars-cover-
and-concealment.aspx [https://perma.cc/4C5Z-42V9] ("Every well-trained cop can explain
the difference between cover and concealment. One common summary I have heard is[:]
'Cover stops the bullets that are being fired at you[,] and concealment hides you from the
suspect but does not stop bullets."').
234 Ronald J. Adams et al., Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters 155 (1980) ("As
you approach any situation, you want o be in the habit of looking for cover, so you can react
2017]
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an officer who initiates a traffic stop will park his car behind and slightly
to the left of the stopped vehicle, which puts more of the engine block
between the officer and the stopped vehicle, providing cover.235 Further,
the officer may use his overhead lights or a spotlight to create a "wall of
light" that hides the police vehicle from anyone in the suspect vehicle,
providing a measure of concealment. Had officers parked a block away
from where Tamir Rice was standing, for example, they could have ap-
proached the park while using foliage, other vehicles, light and tele-
phone poles, tree trunks, and other features as cover and concealment,
keeping those obstacles between themselves and the suspect they were
approaching.
Tactical Restraint & Tactical Withdrawal. Sound tactics do not
end with officers approaching with cover and concealment. As an of-
ficer approaches a particular situation or encounters resistance or the risk
of resistance, she must choose whether to aggress, hold her position, or
withdraw. In many situations, officers may be better served by holding a
tactically-advantageous position (tactical restraint) or by withdrawing to
a more tactically-advantageous position (tactical withdrawal) rather than
advancing further. 6 Both restraint and withdrawal have the effect of
creating time, slowing an encounter so that officers can avoid making a
split-second decision to use force. When it can be safely accomplished,
maintaining or retreating to a position of safety can reduce the immedi-
ate threat to the officer, which avoids the need to use force to deal with
that threat at that moment. Consider a simple example: An officer re-
sponds to a wheelchair-bound paraplegic who is armed with, and ag-
gressively waving, a knife in a large, empty parking lot. Should the of-
ficer approach to within arm's length of the suspect, he might have to
use deadly force to avert the high risk of being stabbed or cut. It takes no
extensive tactical training to conclude that he officer should avoid put-
automatically to reach it should trouble erupt."); id. at 69-75 (describing how officers pre-
paring to approach a pedestrian should select the location and environment that favors them).
235 That positioning also provides the officer with some protection from vehicles traveling
on the road.
236 See, e.g., Police Exec. Research Forum, Critical Issues in Policing Series: Guiding
Principles on Use of Force 20-22 (2016) (discussing how tactical repositioning can be part
of a proportional police response to threat); Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement's "Warrior"
Problem, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 225, 232-33 (2015); see also Louis Hayes, Jr., Police Opera-
tional Philosophy, Illinois Model (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.theillinoismodel.com/
2013/04/police-operational-philosophy.html [https://perma.cc/HF6Q-T6HZ] (characterizing
restraint as tending toward the stabilization end of the operational philosophy spectrum,
which is favored by courts).
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ting himself in that position by stopping a relatively safe distance away
(to avoid being stabbed) and by using cover or concealment (to mitigate
the risk of a thrown knife), rather than rushing in to go "hands on" by
physically engaging the suspect. In other words, unless the exigencies of
the situation demand otherwise, the officer should use tactical restraint.
Should the suspect move closer to the officer, the officer can tactically
withdraw by falling back to maintain a safe distance. And should the
suspect move away from the officer, the officer can mirror that move-
ment to retain some control over the scene (particularly control over the
suspect's ability to leave unimpeded or to access civilians) without clos-
ing to an unsafe distance.237
Although decision time is a central concept-perhaps the central con-
cept--of police tactics, Fourth Amendment decisions do not take any
particular notice of the tactics that are designed to maximize the quality
of officer decision making, including distance, cover and concealment,
and restraint and withdrawal.
3. Minimizing Force
Police tactics can reduce the need for force by encouraging officers to
approach individuals in ways that both reduce the incentives for re-
sistance and affirmatively discourage resistance. As the descriptions
suggest, these techniques are difficult to use in a time-pressured envi-
ronment, one in which officers must make a truly split-second decision
between using force and not. As a result, these are tactics that require an
officer to create time in which to use them. In Section E, we describe po-
lice policies that counsel limiting force to the minimum force that is
necessary; many agencies and even some statutes now require that force
be used "only when necessary.'238
237 There are, of course, limits to tactical movement. In many cases, for example, it would
be imprudent for officers to move in a way that allows the suspect o escape a controlled pe-
rimeter. For example, officers surrounding a suspect in the middle of the street can use a rov-
ing perimeter that follows the suspect as he walks around, but officers surrounding a suspect
on a sidewalk might not be able to do so for fear that the suspect will duck into a building.
Given sufficient time, officers in the latter case could evacuate and secure nearby buildings
to Epreserve their flexibility to establish a roving perimeter.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs & Border Prot., HB 4500-01C,
Use of Force Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook 3 (2014); see also Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-404 (2012) (severely limiting the use of deadly force); Samuel Walker, The




Conflict Avoidance. An officer-civilian encounter is a series of itera-
tive events as both the officer and the civilian respond to the other's ac-
tions. When a civilian views an officer as domineering, disrespectful, or
entitled, the perception is that the officer is assuming a higher social sta-
tus than the civilian holds. That perception can rub people the wrong
way, provoking pushback or outright resistance as the civilian seeks to
assert his own status: "Because few people like being humiliated or gra-
tuitously ordered about, an officer's expectation of and insistence on
deference increases the potential for conflict. This may be particularly
true in times of tension between the police and the community.
'239 Of-
ficers can use conflict-avoidance techniques to minimize the chances
that their actions will provoke civilian resistance. By interacting with ci-
vilians in a way that acknowledges their social status and by recognizing
a civilian's need to maintain "face" in front of the officer and other
members of the community, officers can avoid conflict that a different
attitude can create. There is, for example, a meaningful distinction in
how an individual will respond to an officer who makes an effort to earn
her cooperation and an officer who demands her compliance. One of us
demonstrates this concept in police training through the use of a "coop-
eration/compliance" drill. The audience is divided in half, and the fol-
lowing instructions are directed at the first half: "Would you guys mind
standing up for me? Great, thanks. Yeah, everybody stand up for me
here. I know, this is odd, but bear with me. Okay, we're all standing.
Great!"2 4' The half of the audience that is now standing is asked to per-
form several intentionally silly actions:
Let's stretch our arms way overhead. Yeah, put 'em up there. Great
job, really reach up. Okay, this is our Superman pose. Now let's put
our arms up at a forty-five degree angle, really hold 'em up there.
Okay, awesome, now point your fingers down at the ground. Wonder-
ful, everyone. This is our Batman pose. Let's finish out the big three
of the Justice League, go ahead and give me a Wonder Woman pose,
239 Stoughton, supra note 184, at 655-56.
240 Stoughton has conducted this exercise a dozen times at different events, including the
National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives Annual Conference in 2015;
the Trending Issues in Policing Summit at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center on
September 29, 2016; and a Senior Executive training session at the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives on December 1, 2016. After Stoughton did it with the Rich-




too. Really excellent job, thank you, everybody. Go ahead and sit
down for me, and let's everyone give them a round of applause.
Attention is then turned to the other half of the audience, who re-
ceived a series of barked commands, "Stand the fuck up! Do it now!
Stand up! Stand the fuck up, damn it!" In doing this drill multiple times
in front of audiences of various sizes, including several hundred people,
only a very few people stand up. They are then asked (politely) to sit
down, and the audience is asked to think about what just happened. Half
of the audience not only stood when asked, they publicly performed a
series of mildly embarrassing actions. But the vast majority of the other
half refused to even stand up, a much simpler and less embarrassing ac-
tion. Those who do stand up typically exhibit some face-saving behav-
iors, such as laughing or joking with one another to communicate that
they are humoring an odd request, not complying with an order. The
point, as the audience quickly realizes, is that the manner in which they
were told to stand created conflict and prompted resistance. As that
demonstration suggests, officers can use conflict avoidance techniques
to encourage cooperation in situations where a more adversarial or
commandeering approach can generate resistance.24'
De-escalation. Whereas conflict avoidance techniques are intended to
avoid creating conflict, de-escalation techniques are designed to nonvio-
lently resolve conflict that has already manifested. It is here, even more
than conflict avoidance, where tactical communication plays a role in
managing the social interaction. De-escalation techniques teach officers
to calibrate their own response when a civilian's actions deprive them of
status. "Verbal Judo," an early iteration of tactical communication train-
ing, suggested that officers deflect insults or curses without trying to en-
gage with or respond to them.42 Officers were trained to respond to in-
sults by using a "strip phrase," a phrase described as "a deflector that
strips the insult of its power," before pivoting to refocus the conversa-
tion.243 For example, an officer who was insulted during the course of a
traffic stop might respond, "Well, I 'preciate that, sir, but I need to see
your license.,244 Where "Verbal Judo" training emphasized deflecting
241 Unfortunately, officers are still widely taught to take command of any given situation.
See Stoughton, supra note 184, at 651-58.
242 George J. Thompson & Jerry B. Jenkins, Verbal Judo: The Gentle Art of Persuasion
62-63 (2013).
243 Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244 Id.
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aggression, more recent tactical-communications training has drawn
from procedural-justice concepts to emphasize positive engagement as a
way to reduce conflict. For example, Sue Rahr, a member of President
Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing,245 Seattle Police Chief
John Diaz, and then-Washington State Criminal Justice Training Com-
mission Director Joe Hawe use the acronym "LEED," for "Listen and
Explain with Equity and Dignity. '246 Tactical-communications training
that focuses specifically on de-escalation includes a broad range of tech-
niques intended to develop rapport and build goodwill, all of which are
intended to minimize the use of force, but which require time to deploy.
Verbal Directions. Verbal directions can provide notice to a civilian
about what the officer intends to do, what the officer wants the civilian
to do (a command), or what the consequences of noncompliance might
be (a warning). Verbal directions encourage communication-both be-
tween the officer and the suspect and between officers-and, because
they need not be accompanied by a change in position or physical force,
they offer officers an opportunity to assess the situation as well as time
in which to make decisions or adjust their approach. The Supreme Court
stated in Garner that verbal warnings should be given "where feasible"
before using deadly force against a fleeing suspect.247 However, more
detailed policies describe how officers can use clear instructions to help
reduce the need for use of force; we describe in Section E how most
large agencies encourage or require the use of verbal warnings before
applying deadly force, although fewer do so regarding nondeadly
force.248
Backup. Other tactics, involving securing additional resources such
as backup, can reduce the amount of force that officers must use on an
individual. In some cases, having multiple officers present can create a
moderating effect on civilian behavior; someone who may consider re-
245 Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Task Force on 21 st Century
Policing (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/
president-obama-announces-task-force-2 1 st-century-policing [https://perma.cc/HMH9-
W87R].
246 Sue Rahr et al., The Four Pillars of Justice Based Policing: Listen and Explain with Eq-
uity and Dignity, The Loyalty Sols. Grp. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://loyaltysolutionsgroup.com/
the-four-pillars-of-justice-based-policing/ [https://perma.cc/H8R7-NLMS].
247471 U.S. at 11-12.
248 See, e.g., Memorandum from Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Commentary Regarding
the Use of Deadly Force in Non-Custodial Situations (Oct. 17, 1995),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-general-october- 17 1995-memorandum-resolution- 14-
attachment-1 [https://perma.cc/EY5D-L9YR].
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sisting one officer's attempt to put her into handcuffs may be less likely
to do so when there are additional officers on scene. Even when it does
not change a civilian's decision to resist, it can still reduce the use of
force by providing officers with a numerical advantage; actions that may
threaten one officer can be less threatening when there are multiple of-
ficers involved.2 49 Because the threat is reduced, the amount of force that
officers need to use to address that threat may similarly be reduced.
Tactical Case Study: Crisis Intervention Tactics. Perhaps the best-
known modem example of a wholesale shift toward tactical training
comes in the form of Crisis Intervention Training, which has established
a strong track record of improving the ability of officers to safely deal
with individuals in the midst of a mental health crisis. Prior to the 1970s,
officers were taught to quickly and aggressively establish control over
suspects, especially those with apparent mental illnesses.25° In the 1970s,
this training shifted to what modem policing knows as the Crisis Inter-
vention model.251 Crisis Intervention is an umbrella term for a series of
tactics and techniques that are intended to enable officers to avoid force
when interacting with someone in the midst of crisis. Although Crisis
Intervention Training and Crisis Intervention Teams are most closely as-
sociated with mental health issues, the nature of the "crisis" is effective-
ly irrelevant: The core principles are applicable whether someone is
emotionally distressed because of a mental health issue or because of
events in his personal life. Crisis Intervention Training typically includes
multiple dimensions, including how officers can recognize a person in
crisis and the tactics and techniques that officers can use to avoid vio-
lence by communicating effectively.25 2 The tactical component of Crisis
249 William Terrill & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Situational and Officer-Based Determinants
of Police Coercion, 19 Just. Q. 215, 234-35 (2002) (suggesting that having multiple officers
on scene may decrease the need to use force). It is important to acknowledge the sociological
drivers of use-of-force decisions, however, as empirical research has found a correlation be-
tween having more officers on scene and the increased use of force. Id. at 239. The presence
of multiple officers may decrease the potential threat while still creating an incentive for of-
ficers to use force to maintain their professional image in front of their colleagues.
250 The need to establish control over a scene and to demonstrate what is known as "com-
mand presence" remains a predominant model for officers in other contexts. Stoughton, su-
pra note 184, at 652.
251 Robert T. Flint, Crisis Intervention Training, 43 FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 6 (1974).252 Our focus here is on the tactical applications of a Crisis Intervention approach, but it is
worth noting that Crisis Intervention itself goes well beyond the street-level interaction be-
tween rank-and-file officers and persons in crisis. A broader approach to Crisis Intervention
may include partnerships between the medical mental health community and the police
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Intervention Training instructs officers to maintain a safe distance to
slow the pace of the encounter so that they can use tactical communica-
tion and verbal de-escalation.253 Although empirical evidence about po-
lice uses of force is notoriously spotty, several studies suggest hat offic-
ers who use the tactics they learn from Crisis Intervention Training use
less force than officers who have not had such training.254 Officers also
engage in more treatment-oriented responses, potentially using their en-
forcement authority (i.e., arrest powers) less often with regard to indi-
viduals with mental health issues,255 which may contribute to the reduc-
tion in uses of force.
agency to provide a range of support services after the initial interaction with an officer. The
"Memphis Model" of Crisis Intervention, for example, includes tactics and techniques within
a broader approach that emphasizes pre-arrest jail diversion and post-event treatment conti-
nuity. Memphis Model, CIT International, http://www.citinternational.org/training-
overview/163-memphis-model.html. The "Illinois Model" emphasizes adaptive problem
solving. Louis Hayes, Jr., Police Crisis Intervention & Illinois Model, The Illinois Model
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.theillinoismodel.com/2015/08/police-crisis-intervention-
illinois.html [https://perma.cc/Q9P8-HX63].
253 See Randolph Dupont et al., Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements 14 (2007),
http://cit.memphis.edu/pdf/CoreElements.pdf [https://perma.ccVL89-YREX]; U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Final Report of the President's Task Force
on 21st Century Policing 2 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce
finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2PH-WMEV]; Amy C. Watson & Anjali J. Fulambarker,
The Crisis Intervention Team Model of Police Response to Mental Health Crises: A Primer
for Mental Health Practitioners, 8 Best Prac. Ment. Health 71 (2012),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3769782/ [https://perma.cc/87NY-R-EWU].
254 See Michael T. Compton et al., Use of Force Preferences and Perceived Effectiveness
of Actions Among Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Police Officers and Non-CIT Officers in
an Escalating Psychiatric Crisis Involving a Subject with Schizophrenia, 37 Schizophrenia
Bull. 737, 742 (2011); Jennifer Skeem & Lynne Bibeau, How Does Violence Potential Re-
late to Crisis Intervention Team Responses to Emergencies?, 59 Psychiatric Serv. 201, 204
(2008); Paul W. Spaite & Mark S. Davis, The Mentally Ill and the Criminal Justice System:
A Review of Programs 17-23 (June 2005), http://www.namiohio.org/images/publications/
Publications/REVIEW PROGRAMS.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6TE-6ERU] (finding multiple
benefits identified in prior CIT studies, including fewer injuries to officers and a reduction in
the number of arrests and use-of-force incidents).
255 See Henry J. Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of Police Re-
sponses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 Psychiatric Serv. 645 (2000) (finding that officers
in Memphis who had received training in the Memphis CIT model were less likely to arrest
persons with mental illnesses than officers who used a different specialized response in two
other jurisdictions); Jennifer L.S. Teller et al., Crisis Intervention Team Training for Police
Officers Responding to Mental Disturbance Calls, 57 Psychiatric Serv. 234-35 (2006).
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D. Proportionality and the Force Matrix
In addition to the tactical concepts of time and force minimization,
proportionality is also central to police tactics, policies, and the agency-
specific training that officers receive. The most common incarnation of
proportionality today can be found in the "force matrix" used by thirty-
one of the fifty largest police agencies.256 A force matrix recognizes that
the use of force is not binary: The fact that force is justified in a given
scenario does not mean that all applications of force are justified in that
scenario. Often, some types of force-say, tackling someone to the
ground-will be appropriate at the same time that other types of force-
such as deadly force-will not be. Many police policies and training ma-
terials communicate this point through the use of a "force matrix '257 that
visually depicts when police may use escalating degrees of force.258 The
adoption of use-of-force matrices remains a controversial point within
law enforcement circles; some trainers dislike the underlying con-
259 ohrcepts, while others dislike the way the concepts are implemented in a
force matrix.260 Nevertheless, force matrices remain a common feature
of police use-of-force policies.261
The development of a force matrix depends on the arrangement of
two components: a resistance continuum and a force continuum. Both
continua categorize behavior-a resistance continuum categorizes civil-
256 See infra Appendix.
257 We use "force continuum" to refer to a standalone classification of officer force and
"force matrix" to refer to a force continuum in combination with a resistance continuum. It is
common to see less precise usage in which the two terms are synonymous.
258 Paul W. Brown, The Continuum of Force in Community Supervision, 58 Fed. Proba-
tion 31, 31-32 (1994).
259 See John Bostain, Use of Force: Are Continuums Still Necessary?, 4 FLETC J. 33, 33




260 Louis Hayes, Jr., Police Force: The Gap Between Reasonable and Necessary, Virtus
Group (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.virtusleadership.com/l/post/2016/02/police-force-the-gap-
between-reasonable-and-necessary.html [https://perma.cc/736V-D7JF].
261 Research in 2006 estimated over seventy percent of law enforcement agencies included
force matrices in their departmental policies. William Terrill & Eugene A. Paoline, Force
Continuums: Moving Beyond Speculation and Toward Empiricism, 7 Law Enforcement Ex-
ec. 27, 28 (2007). Research in 2011 estimated the number at more than eighty percent. Wil-
liam Terrill et al., Final Technical Report Draft: Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and
Outcomes ii (May 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237794.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VM4-BBPZ].
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ian behavior while the force continuum categorizes officer behavior-
and arrange the categories by relative severity.262 A force matrix corre-
lates the force continuum with the resistance continuum, creating a for-
malized representation of how the gradations of force can be applied in
response to various types of resistance. A stand-alone force continuum,
in other words, tells an officer what force he can use (what use-of-force
options are available to him), but a force matrix introduces a resistance
continuum to tell him when he can use it.
263
There can be significant variation with regard to the way a force ma-
trix is depicted,264 as well as the amount of detail embedded in the ma-
trix itself,265 but most force and resistance continua broadly conform to
the following pattern. Resistance is broken into levels that characterize a
civilian's actions, such as the following six levels:
1. Presence: the civilian's body language, demeanor, and atti-
tude;
2. Verbal Resistance: verbal indications of non-compliance;
3. Passive Physical Resistance: non-compliance, failing to obey
an officer's orders;
4. Active Physical Resistance: engaging the muscles in a non-
aggressive way, as by pulling away or running;
262 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, The Use-of-Force Continuum (Aug. 4,
2009) [hereinafter The Use-of-Force Continuum], http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/law-
enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/continuum.aspx [https ://perma.cc/4VM4-
BBPZ] (referring to force continua as "describ[ing] a[n] escalating series of actions an of-
ficer may take to resolve a situation"); see also William A. Geller & Michael S. Scott, Dead-
ly Force: What We Know 309 (1992) ("The 'force continuum' connotes a spectrum of con-
trol tactics from body language and oral communication to weaponless physical control to
nonlethal weapons to lethal measures.").
263 Additional policies beyond the force matrix may also govern when force is appropriate.
See infra Section II.E.
264 See, e.g., Christine Hess Orthmann et al., Criminal Investigation 242-43 (10th ed.
2012) (providing examples of both a linear force matrix and a circular force matrix); John G.
Peters, Jr. & Michael A. Brave, Force Continuums: Are They Still Needed?, 22 Police &
Sec. News 1, 3 (Jan./Feb. 2006) (reproducing a barometer-style force matrix); Ross Wolf et
al., Police Use of Force and the Cumulative Force Factor, 32 Policing 739, 744 (2009) (dis-
playing a ladder-style force matrix).
265 See, e.g., Chi. Police Dep't, General Order G03-02-01, The Use of Force Model, Illus-
tration No. 1 (2012), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-
ae912-8fff-cecl 1383d806e05f.html?ownapi=l [https://perma.cc/H3BU-UT2L] (illustrating a
highly detailed force matrix).
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5. Aggressive Physical Resistance: physically attacking the of-
ficer; and
6. Aggravated Physical Resistance: physically attacking the of-
ficer in a way likely to cause death or great bodily harm.266
The potential responses to resistance are similarly categorized into
different levels:
1. Officer Presence: the officer's body language, demeanor, and
attitude;
2. Verbal Commands: the use of authority, non-physical force;
3. Empty-Hand Techniques: the use of soft (grabbing and hold-
ing) or hard (punching and striking) bodily force;
4. Intermediate Techniques: the use of less-lethal weapons-
such as a baton, chemical spray, or TASER-or bodily weap-
ons that are more serious than empty-hand techniques but un-
likely to cause serious bodily harm or death; and
5. Lethal Force: the use of weapons or techniques that are sub-
stantially likely to cause serious bodily harm or death.267
Although there can be significant variation, the "incremental" model
of force matrices starts with the physical presence of an officer at the
lowest level of the force matrix and culminates with the use of deadly
force at the highest level.268 An officer's force options are then aligned
with a certain type or types of resistance. For example, a force matrix
might indicate that officers can use "verbal communication" and a "soft
assisting touch," but not physical force, after giving the suspect a lawful
order.269 There is no universal agreement on the number of levels in ei-
ther the force or resistance continua-five or six are the most com-
266 Lake City Police Dep't, General Orders Manual 4-5 (May 21, 2010),
http://www.lcfla.com/documents/Police/Use%20o/2OForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C4H-
68G6].
267 The Use-of-Force Continuum, supra note 262.
268 Alpert et al., supra note 187, at ch. 2 (describing the development and formulation of
incremental matrices); see also Orthmann et al., supra note 264, at 242-43 (providing an ex-
ample of an incremental force matrix and a situational force continuum); The Use-of-Force
Continuum, supra note 262 (providing a non-graphical representation of a force continuum).
269 Lake City Police Dep't, supra note 266, at 5.
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mon 27°-or on where different weapons or actions are placed on the ma-
trix. For example, there is tremendous variation in where agencies put
Electric Control Weapons such as the TASER: Some agencies allow it
to be used against active (but nonviolent) resistance, while others restrict
it to situations involving violent resistance.2
Regardless of how any particular force matrix is depicted or the exact
nature of its content, they are intended as a guide for officers. An officer
on the street neither engages in the "totality of the circumstances" bal-
ancing that accompanies judicial review of excessive-force claims nor
acts out of blind instinct with the hope that his reaction fortuitously co-
incides with the constitutional standard of reasonableness. Instead, offic-
ers rely on what is, at many law enforcement academies and agencies,
relatively thorough training that identifies in advance the types of re-
sistance an individual may offer and details a range of appropriate re-
sponses. Indeed, police departments adopt and use force matrices not to
specify the appropriate level of force for all possible situations, but ra-
ther as a method of conceptualizing the dynamic nature of officer-
involved violence and as a foundational part of officer training.27 2
270 Most five-level matrices consist of Officer Presence, Verbal Commands, Empty-Hand
Techniques, Intermediate Weapons/Less-Lethal Techniques, and Lethal Force. Six-level ma-
trices follow the same format, but either split Empty-Hand Techniques into Soft Techniques
(such as pain compliance techniques and joint manipulations) and Hard Techniques (such as
punches and kicks) or split the Intermediate Weapons/Less-Lethal Techniques category into
two different categories that can include either different weapons or different ways of using a
single weapon. See, e.g., The Use-of-Force Continuum, supra note 262 (five-level matrix);
Lake City Police Dep't, supra note 266, at 4-5 (six-level matrix).
271 James M. Cronin & Joshua A. Ederheimer, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Cmty. Ori-
ented Policing Servs. & Police Exec. Research Forum, Conducted Energy Devices: Devel-
opment of Standards for Consistency and Guidance 23-24 (2006),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ced standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MXL-YM22]. Re-
garding inconsistency among law enforcement agencies in how TASERs are placed in the
force continuum or matrix, see U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-05-464, Taser
Weapons: Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement Agencies 9-10 (2005).
272 Alpert et al., supra note 187, at ch. 2 ("In what were, and often still are, called 'defen-
sive tactics' classes, officers were learning how to use different types of force - the mechan-
ics of how to strike someone with a baton, for example, or deploy pepper spray. Through the
various continua and models, police trainers were looking for ways to educate officers about
when to use different types of force."); John C. Desmedt, Use of Force Paradigm for Law
Enforcement, 12 J. Police Sci. & Admin. 170 (1984); James Marker, Teaching 4th Amend-
ment-Based Use-of-Force, 7 AELE Monthly L.J. 501, 502 (2012) (describing the creation of
the first force continuum "as an instructional aide, designed to assist criminal justice trainers
throughout the country"); Gregory J. Connor, Use of Force Continuum: Phase 11, 39 Law &
Ord. 30 (1991); Franklyn Graves & Gregory Connor, The FLETC Use-of-Force Model, 59
Police Chief 56 (1992).
272
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As a training tool, every force matrix must balance two competing
priorities: They must be clear enough for an officer to understand and
implement effectively while also being broad enough to provide useful
guidance for the innumerable scenarios in which an officer may use
force. Most force matrices accommodate these objectives by identifying
the particular types of permissible force with more detail at the lower
end of the force continuum, where the officer initiates violent contact to
overcome some nonviolent resistance, but providing correspondingly
less detail in cases of more extreme force, where the civilian initiates vi-
olent contact.273 As a result, a force matrix provides a more detailed list
of appropriate responses to an officer responding to low levels of re-
sistance than it does to an officer who is being violently attacked by an
armed aggressor.
It is important to note the limits of force matrices. They apply without
reference to the underlying justifications for the police-civilian encoun-
ter or the relative importance of the state interest at stake; once a legiti-
mate law enforcement purpose has been established, a force matrix
guides the officer's response to resistance occasioned during the pursuit
of that purpose. The matrix "guides" an officer's response to resistance,
but it does not clearly regulate it. The force options in a force matrix are
not intended to be exclusive. Officers may use reasonable alternatives
that correspond with the applications of force designated in the matrix
even when those alternatives are not included.274 And while a force ma-
trix is progressive in the sense that many adopt a hierarchical approach
to categorizing resistance and force by severity, it emphatically does not
273 See infra Section II.E.
274 Merle Stetser, The Use of Force in Police Control of Violence: Incidents Resulting in
Assaults on Officers 41 (2001). For example, a flashlight may be deployed as a weapon of
necessity subject to the same restrictions that apply to batons. See, e.g., Andrew Blankstein
& Richard Winton, LAPD Manual Doesn't Bar Flashlight as Weapon, L.A. Times (June 30,
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/30/local/me-flashlights30 [https://perma.cc/
L2KE-58BJ]. Notably, the Los Angeles Police Department developed and purchased small-
er, less weapon-like flashlights precisely to make weapons of necessity less available to of-
ficers after a 2004 incident where officers beat suspected car thief Stanley Miller with an
older model metal flashlight. Richard Winton, Police Panel Endorses Limits on Use of
Flashlights, L.A. Times (Dec. 15, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/1 5/local/me-
poxcoml5 [https://perma.cc/BG59-554U]; Doug Wyllie, IACP Special: LAPD Builds a
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impose any requirements of sequential progression.275 Officers can use
force that correlates to contemporaneous resistance without starting at
the lowest option and "building up" to a particular application of
force. 6 Relatedly, force matrices do not in and of themselves require
officers to use the least severe of permissible force options in any given
situation.277 While some agencies have adopted minimum-force policies,
such policies are separate and apart from a force matrix.278
In their attempt to provide useful guidance to officers, force matrices
can be too simple, failing to provide context-dependent guidance and
training at the correct level of specificity. Active resistance by a person
trying to roll away from police in a wheelchair looks very different than
active resistance by an Olympic marathon runner who is fleeing from of-
ficers on foot. Under the plain terms of a force matrix, though, the two
are treated equally because both would constitute "active" resistance.
The same can be said for a more common example: An individual who
pulls away from officers is, for the purposes of a force matrix, the
equivalent of a handcuffed suspect who pulls away from officers. Force
matrices, then, are overinclusive to the extent that they apply the same
standard to inividuals who are elderly, frail, obese, and physically disa-
275 See Stetser, supra 274, at 41; The Use-of-Force Continuum, supra note 262.
276 However, most officers still begin encounters by giving verbal commands or initiating
relatively low-level force. Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Understanding Police
Use of Force: Officers, Suspects and Reciprocity 90-91 (2004). Confusion engendered by
the sequential appearance of many traditional force matrices has led some agencies to adopt
non-linear depictions. Alpert et al., supra note 187, at ch. 2; see, e.g., Brenda Zanin, RMCP
Use of Force and the Law, 70 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette 14, 14-15 (2009),
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70n4/vol70n4-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB6V-J9K7].
7 Whether this is a component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness has divided courts.
Compare Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring officers to effectu-
ate seizures using "the least intrusive means reasonably available" (quoting St. John v. Hick-
ey, 411 F.3d 762, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Wil-
kinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding availability of a less-intrusive
alternative does not make use of deadly force unreasonable (citing Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d
912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).
278 See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New World of Police Accountability 51 (2005) (describ-
ing minimum-force policies as the "prevailing standard"); Police Use of Force, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/welcome.htm [https://perma.cc/364K-N22C]. Mini-
mum-force policies remain contested in law enforcement circles, with critics claiming that
such requirements lead to a "trial and error process" that increases the risk of escalation and
injury that may have been avoided if officers were free to use more serious force to establish




bled as they do to Olympic athletes in their physical prime. The Graham
decision, focused as it was on setting out a reasonableness tandard, sim-
ilarly provides no guidance. Indeed, Graham was not only disabled, but
he broadcasted the specific nature of the disability to the officers he was
interacting with, and he was not resisting arrest. The force applied-
pushing him onto and then throwing him in the squad car--occurred af-
ter he was already restrained.279
In their attempt to acknowledge the nuance of use-of-force situations,
however, force matrices can also be overly complicated. Conceptually,
an officer's use of physical force is either assertive or defensive.280 The
vast majority of police violence involves the use of assertive force,281
which, as the name implies, is used to assert or enforce an officer's legal
authority to apprehend or subdue someone whose actions may frustrate
legitimate goals of the criminal justice institution,282 but which do not
present a violent threat to the officer or anyone else. For example, a pas-
sive protestor who refuses an officer's orders to vacate the driveway of
an abortion clinic, an arrestee who grabs a pole and refuses to release it
as an officer attempts to put her in handcuffs, and a shoplifting suspect
who runs away after being commanded to stop are all engaged in re-
sistance, but nonviolent resistance. Police training and policy, including
the force matrices discussed above, typically recognize that threats of in-
stitutional frustration are of less concern than threats of physical vio-
lence, and they restrict officers' ability to use force accordingly.283 The
threat of institutional frustration is a legitimate concern, however; pas-
279 This is an important observation, because courts far more readily find liability in the
situations in which no policy or training would permit use of heightened force-when an
individual is already restrained. See, e.g., Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir.
2010); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2008).
280 Handcuffing falls into an uncomfortable grey area in our practical and legal understand-
ing of force interstice in the force and resistance continua that make up most force matrices.
Law enforcement officers may apply handcuffs with the minimum possible violence, yet
locking someone's hands behind their back is clearly not a communicative element of an of-
ficer-civilian encounter the way a "guiding touch" can be.
281 See Tom McEwen, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Data
Collection on Police Use of Force 34 (1996), bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MJP4-LDF4].
28 For a discussion on what counts as a legitimate law enforcement interest, see Harmon,
supra note 21, at 1150-55. 
283 As the Supreme Court stated in Garner, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than
that they escape." 471 U.S. at 11.
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sive resistance can make official actions more difficult, 284 while active
resistance presents a risk of escape.285 For that reason, most force matri-
ces permit an officer to use take-downs and pain compliance techniques,
sometimes including chemical irritants and electronic control weapons,
in response to passive resistance,286 although there are some excep-
tions.2 87 While the classification of TASERs and other conductive ener-
gy weapons as pain compliance techniques has generated both legal
scholarship288 and significant media attention,289 there has been relative-
ly little written in legal journals about the use of pain compliance gener-
284 Passive resistance in the law enforcement context is a concept familiar to federal courts.
See, e.g., Shreve v. Jessamine Cty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding
"passive resistance" an inadequate justification for significant force); United States v. Hollis,
447 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding passive protest does not constitute the use of
force against an officer for the purposes of state law); United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d
1152, 1154 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding that assault and resisting arrest require more than passive
resistance); Mavromatis v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir.
1949) (noting it did not clearly appear from facts whether protestors refusing to leave ship
offered "more than passive resistance").
285 See, e.g., Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, Use of Force, at sec. 5,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/Use-of-Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJP4-LDF4]. This division is
widely recognized by law enforcement. See also Edmund Zigmund, Police Use of Force:
The Problem of Passive Resistance, 72-3 Police Chief Mag. (2005),
https://web.archive.org/web/20111215062102/http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazin
e/index.cfm?fuseaction=print display&articleid=563&issue id=42005 [https://perma.cc/
PE4H-ZM4Q] (describing the distinction between active and passive resistance). The Su-
preme Court explicitly acknowledged active resistance-and evasion of arrest by flight, per-
haps the most extreme example of active resistance-as one of the "facts and circumstances"
courts must consider in determining whether a seizure is reasonable under Fourth Amend-
ment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
286 See Karen Matison Hess et al., Police Operations: Theory & Practice 94 (6th ed. 2014);
Wolf, supra note 264, at 748 (listing "Compliance hold," "Takedown," and "Chemical
agent" as appropriate responses to passive resistance).
287 For examples of force matrices that do not appear to permit physically forceful re-
sponses to passive resistance, see Merle Stetser, The Use of Force in Police Control of Vio-
lence: Incidents Resulting in Assaults on Officers 36-40 (2001) (limiting the response to
passive resistance to "firm grip" control).
288 See, e.g., Sam W. Wu, "When Can I Tase Him, Bro?": Bryan v. McPherson and the
Propriety of Police Use of Tasers, 40 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 361 (2010); Jeff Fabian, Note,
Don't Tase Me Bro!: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Laws Governing Taser Use by Law
Enforcement, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 763 (2010); Elizabeth Seals, Comment, Police Use of Tasers:
The Truth is "Shocking," 38 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 109 (2007).




ally as a response to passive resistance.290 Police policy and training typ-
ically authorizes the use of more severe assertive physical force, includ-
ing "hard" techniques2 91 and intermediate (or "less-lethal") weapons
such as batons, as a response to active resistance.
In addition to the more common assertive force, officers also use
force defensively. Sometimes a suspect abandons any attempt to escape
and instead turns to attack the officer, or refuses to obey an officer's
commands to stop attacking another civilian. In such circumstances, of-
ficers use force not to prevent the frustration of institutional goals, but to
prevent physical injury to themselves or others. Actions that may be
physically threatening but which are unlikely to cause great bodily harm
12or death are often termed "aggressive" resistance,292 while resistance that
presents a substantial risk of such injury or death are called "aggravated"
or "deadly force" resistance.293 Law enforcement policy and training in
the context of defensive force is far more permissive about the use of
weapons and techniques that create a substantial risk of bodily harm or
death.
Generic force matrices standing alone do not help officers make
judgments concerning the particular individual they are confronting;
sound policy and training requires additional guidance on how to ap-
proach certain classes of vulnerable individuals. Professor Michael
Avery has argued that the "totality of the circumstances" relevant to a
use of force is very different when police encounter emotionally dis-
turbed people.294 In the context of assessing the "totality of the circum-
stances" concerning interrogations and their voluntariness, the Supreme
Court has emphasized how whether a person is a juvenile, or intellectu-
290 For two exceptions, see Michael D. Mitchell, Note, Forrester v. City of San Diego: Is
Pain Compliance An Appropriate Police Practice Under the Fourth Amendment?, 40 Vill. L.
Rev. 1177, 1181 (1995), and Benjamin I. Whipple, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and
the Police Use of "Pain Compliance" Techniques on Nonviolent Arrestees, 28 San Diego L.
Rev. 177, 201 (1991).
29 1 Hard hand or hard empty-hand techniques include punches and other strikes performed
with a closed fist. See, e.g., The Use-of-Force Continuum, supra note 262.
292 See, e.g., Michael E. Miller, Taser Use and the Use-of-Force Continuum: Examining
the Effect of Policy Change, 77 Police Chief 72, 73 (2010).
293 Id.
294 See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the To-
tality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally
Disturbed People, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261, 266-67 (2003).
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ally disabled, or mentally ill, all affects the analysis.295 The Supreme
Court has yet to address the related question whether use of force must
take into account vulnerability of the person encountered, and the differ-
ent behavior that a reasonable officer would expect such a person to en-
gage in during an encounter. Contemporary police training could help
the Court come to an informed opinion on those issues.
E. Empirical Evidence on Current Police Policies
What policies do agencies actually adopt today, and on which of the
subjects just discussed? There is some evidence that agencies adopt
highly varied policies, many of which are quite minimal and must be ex-
tensively supplemented by training and supervision on law and practice.
Many agencies, for example, do not include in their written policies a
description of the force matrix that we have described in the prior sec-
tion, although the use of such a continuum is often implied, or indicated
through a brief narrative. Many say very little at all beyond a constitu-
tional floor of "reasonableness.296 The constitutional floor then be-
comes their ceiling. Few policies speak to any overall view that the need
to use force should be minimized and that force should be avoided,
when it is possible to do so, through de-escalation and other police tac-
tics.
297
295 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (noting intellectually disabled persons
"face a special risk of wrongful execution because they are more likely to give false confes-
sions, are often poor witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful assistance to their coun-
sel" (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 281 (2011) (recognizing vulnerability of
juvenile suspects during questioning). Model police policies also reflect those differences.
See Brandon L. Garrett, Interrogation Policies, 49 U. Rich. L. Rev. 895, 898 (2015) (noting
that many law enforcement agencies issue ither very little or no guidance on how to inter-
rogate juveniles or intellectually disabled individuals); see generally Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of
Police, Reducing Risks: An Executive's Guide to Effective Juvenile Interview and Interroga-
tion (2012) (promulgating a detailed policy concerning questioning of juveniles).
296 For an example of such a policy, see Indianapolis Metro. Police Dep't, General Order
1.30, Use of Force (July 6, 2012), http://interactives.indystar.com/static/PDF/IMPD/
IMPD%20use%20otf/o20force%20policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UU2-4NQZ] ("[O]fficers
shall use only that amount of force that is reasonable, given the facts and circumstances
known by the officer at the time of the event."). See Madeline Buckley, Read IMPD's Use of
Force Policies, Indianapolis Star (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.indystar.com/
story/news/2015/08/10/read-impds-use-force-policies/31407073/ [https://perma.cc/DB5J-
52QY] (posting Indianapolis use-of-force policy online).
297 For criticism of such practices, and recommendations that such traditional policies by
updated, see Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policy 2.
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The largest-scale empirical study of police use-of-force policies was
completed with funding by the National Institute of Justice. In 2011,
Professors William Terrill, Eugene A. Paoline III, and Jason Ingram sent
a survey to a stratified, random sample of over 1,000 agencies across the
country and conducted a more detailed examination of eight agencies.
They found that "it was difficult to identify a standard practice that is
used by police departments across the country.,298 On the one hand, over
eighty percent of respondents did use some type of force continuum.299
However, there was no typical or common "tactical placement in terms
of force continuum policies," the authors found; there were a "total of
123 different permutations" of force progressions, "ranging from three
to nine different levels."300 Agencies varied in whether citizen resistance
was relevant to the force officers use, and, as described above, there was
wide variation in where chemical spray, hard hands, and conducted en-
ergy devices ("CEDs") were placed in the continua. Some presented de-
grees of uses of force in a linear continuum, while some used a "wheel"
model with a range of options for the officer but no progression of
force.30 ' Even the most commonly used force progressions were used by
less than twenty percent of all departments, while the next most common
was used by only ten percent.30 2 The authors noted how, apparently,
"[d]epartments pick and choose, and tweak and adapt, in a multitude of
ways - all unfortunately, with no empirical evidence as to which ap-
proach is best or even better than another.,
303
We wondered whether policies are more uniform among the largest
agencies that can dedicate more resources to studying best practices and
developing detailed policies. We also wondered whether the largest
agencies were keeping pace with modem recommendations by including
policies that direct officers to use sound tactics, to seek to avoid the need
to use force through de-escalation when it is possible to safely do so, and
to use the minimum amount of force necessary under the circumstances,
as well as establishing mandatory reporting and data collection for use-
298 William Terrill, Eugene A. Paoline III & Jason Ingram, Final Technical Report Draft:
Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes iii (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles 1/nij/grants/237794.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG4U-ZGCP].
299 Id. at 16.
3. Id. at ii, 18.
301 Id. at 1-2.
112 Id. at 27.
303 Id. at 28.
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of-force incidents.3 °4 We have added to the sparse empirical literature on
this subject by conducting an analysis of the force policies of the fifty
largest policing agencies in the United States.3 °5
We start by noting that there is a real public accountability and trans-
parency problem in this area. Many police departments do not make
their written policies public or easily available online or even upon re-
quest. Only seventeen of the fifty largest agencies made their policies
and patrol manuals available online. We were surprised that so many
large agencies do not make their policies available online, especially on
a subject as fundamental as the use of force and deadly force upon the
public. All but one of the fifty agencies' policies were obtained, typical-
ly by requesting them directly from the agencies.°6 However, we had to
make multiple requests at several agencies, and several agencies heavily
redacted their policies, making basic information about the contours of
their use-of-force policies difficult to understand. We are also cognizant,
of course, that there can be a distinction between the policies on the
books and practices on the street. Our argument, however, centers on
encouraging more judicial attention to how police agencies formally
regulate the use of force. It is outside the scope of this article to address
the degree to which formal regulation informally recognizes, and may be
built around, the fact that actual practice deviates to some extent from
policy.
What we found was that even the largest agencies, which one might
expect to be the most sophisticated and attentive to best practices, have
widely varying force policies, many of which were quite minimalistic.
Quite a few of the largest departments, for example, do not have force-
continuum or matrix-type descriptions included in their policies that set
out some type of progression from the least intrusive, to the intermediate
types of force, to the use of deadly force. (Of the forty-nine responding
largest agencies, thirty-one included some form of a force continuum or
matrix and six included a graphic representation of it.) Those that did so
varied quite a bit in the level of detail and the number of levels that they
provided. The Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") contains noth-
304 Surveys examining the content of use-of-force policies have been rare. For an excep-
tion, see one such national survey discussed in Alpert & Dunham, supra note 276, at 156-57.
305 See infra Appendix.




ing of the sort in its policy, for example.30 7 Chicago, in contrast with the
LAPD, provided detailed descriptions of what force is appropriate at
various levels of encounters, noting the overall principle in its 2003 pol-
icy: "The Use of Force Model employs the progressive and reasonable
escalation and de-escalation of member-applied force in proportional re-
sponse to the actions and level of resistance offered by a subject.
308
Chicago since updated this policy, in 2016, to provide still more detail
and to introduce "the concept of Force Mitigation," or techniques de-
signed to avoid and minimize the need to use force.3 9 The Columbus
Police Division set out eight levels of force.3"0
Just under half, or twenty-four, of these large agencies counseled min-
imizing the need to use force, or that officers use the minimum force
necessary. Additional departments stated that officers should only use
necessary force without admonishing that force be minimized.31' We
note that some agencies state that force should be minimized or that only
necessary force should be used, without providing more guidance, or
even later providing inconsistent guidance counseling that officers use
whatever force is reasonable under the circumstances. For example, the
Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., adopts a policy
stating an odd sort of mixture of the Graham standard and a minimiza-
tion approach: Officers "shall use the minimum amount of force that the
objectively reasonable officer would use in light of the circumstances to
effectively bring an incident or person under control, while protecting
307 L.A. Police Dep't, LAPD Manual, at sec. 556.10: Policy on the Use of Force,
http://www.lapdonline.org/lapd manual/volume l.htm [https://perma.cc/V38N-X3LC] (ver-
ified no policy as of March 2017).
308 Chi. Police Dep't, General Order G03-02-01, The Use of Force Model (May 16, 2012),
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-
cecl 383d806e05f.html [https://perma.cc/D7W7-6FTF].
309Chi. Police Dep't, General Order G03-02-02, Force Options (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-
1d970b87782d543f.pdfhl=true [https://perma.cc/C38K-Y9KE].
310 Columbus Police Div., Directive 2.01, Use of Force (June 30, 2014),
http://www.columbuspolice.org/FormsPublications/Directives/Directives/DirectivesNew2 1
5/2.0l.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3CM-2AWB].
311 See infra Appendix. Regarding the need to counsel minimizing the use of force, see
ALI Draft Principles, supra note 1 ("Officers should use the minimum force necessary to
perform their duties safely. Agencies should promote this goal through written policies,
training, supervision, and reporting and review of use-of-force incidents."). See also Police




the lives of the [officer] or others.312 We did credit such agencies as
having policies regarding minimization or proportionality, but we note
that this coding was generous and that just because an agency has a poli-
cy on point does not mean that it is a clear or effective one. The most de-
tailed and perhaps the most forceful policy of this type was the Seattle
Police Department policy, which begins by stating that the "community
expects and the Seattle Police Department requires that officers use only
the force necessary to perform their duties"-officers are to perform
their duties with "minimal reliance upon the use of physical force," and
any force used must be "proportional.,313 The Newark Police has a poli-
cy updated in 2013 stating up front that as a matter of policy, officers
"are charged with the responsibility of using minimum force necessary
to affect [sic] a lawful arrest."'3 14 The Dekalb County, Georgia, depart-
ment policy states: "Officers must exhaust every means available of
non-lethal force, prior to utilizing deadly force," and the policy adds:
"When non-lethal force is utilized, officers should only use that force
which is minimal and reasonable to effect control of a non-compliant
subject.
315
Most of the largest departments did require or encourage verbal warn-
ings before using lethal force. Thirty-two of the policies obtained en-
courage or require the use of verbal warnings before using deadly force,
typically stating that such warnings be given where feasible rather than
requiring their use.316 The LAPD, for example, did not require verbal
warnings. Some agencies were vague on the subject. The Columbus Po-
lice Division policy states that warnings should be given before using
deadly force only "[i]f reasonable," but provides no guidance on how
reasonableness might be assessed.317 Fewer agencies--only about half-
312 D.C. Metro. Police, General Order RAR 901.07, Use of Force 2 (Dec. 1, 2016),
https:/go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO 901 07.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L2C-VQH].
Seattle Police Dep't, Manual, Title 8, 8.000, Use of Force Core Principles (Sept. 1,
2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8--use-of-force/8000--use-of-force-core-
principles [https://perma.cc/HMD5-L7T4].
31 Newark Police Dep't, General Order 63-2, Use of Force by Police Officers 1 (Mar. 4,
2013).
315 Dekalb Cnty. Police Dep't, Employee Manual 4-6, 1 (2014).
316 See infra Appendix; see also ALt Draft Principles, supra note 1 ("Officers should pro-
vide clear instructions and warnings whenever feasible before using force."); IACP National
Consensus Policy on Use of Force, supra note 1, at 4 ("Where feasible, the officer shall iden-
tify himself or herself as a law enforcement officer and warn of his or her intent to use dead-
ly force.").
317 Columbus Police Div., Directive 2.01, supra note 310, at 3.
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encourage or require verbal warnings before using non-lethal (less-lethal
or less-than-lethal) force. One would expect that in nonlethal situations,
especially when officers are using force assertively rather than defen-
sively, there may often be more time for an officer to provide warnings.
Most of the largest departments also included no specific rules or
guidance relating to emotionally disturbed persons, for whom both the
dangers posed and the consequences of the escalation of the use of force
may be completely misunderstood by officers lacking explicit guidance
or specialized training. Only eight departments included specific policies
on the subject. Here, too, there was variation. Cities like San Diego, for
example, established special teams (in San Diego, it is a Psychiatric
Emergency Response Team ("PERT")) specifically to handle potentially
violent situations involving mentally ill or disturbed individuals, with
policy on how and when to call such a team to intervene.318
In general, about half of the policies did not discuss tactics or provide
officers with guidance on how to approach a situation, nor did they dis-
cuss de-escalation or other techniques that could be used to diffuse a
violent threat or avoid the need to use force. 319 Twenty-seven agencies
included policies that discussed tactics or how to approach a situation in
which the need to use force may be present.320 Of those, twenty-four
agency policies discussed de-escalation specifically.3 21 Most detailed
was the Seattle Police Department policy, which contained a separate
stand-alone section on the topic of de-escalation that described a range
of techniques that can be used to avoid the need to use force, including
using distance, cover, concealment, verbal persuasion, avoidance of con-
318 San Diego Police Dep't, Department Procedure 6.28, Psychiatric Emergency Response
Team (PERT) 3 (Nov. 22, 2013) ("PERT is intended to provide humane and beneficial out-
comes for persons with mental illness who have come to the attention of law enforcement.");
see also Grand Jury Report, Psychiatric Emergency Response Team 2 (May 23, 2016),
http://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/grandjury/reports/2015-2016/PERTReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ2D-MAMQ] (describing history and goals and evaluating perfor-
mance of PERT team).
319 See Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policy 5 (stating that, "The Critical
Decision-Making Model provides a new way to approach critical incidents," and describing
a decision-making framework for "critical incidents and other tactical situations").
320 See infra Appendix.
321 See ALI Draft Principles, supra note 1 ("Officers should actively seek to avoid using
force by using tactics such as de-escalation, as circumstances permit."); IACP National Con-
sensus Policy on Use of Force, supra note 1, at 3 ("An officer shall use de-escalation tech-
niques and other alternatives to higher levels of force consistent with his or her training




frontation, calling extra resources, and other tactics.322 The Philadelphia
Police Department policy stood out by directing officers to avoid of-
ficer-created jeopardy and providing guidance about tactical restraint:
Police officers shall ensure their actions do not precipitate the use of
deadly force by placing themselves or others in jeopardy by taking
unnecessary, overly aggressive, or improper actions. It is often a tacti-
cally superior police procedure to withdraw, take cover or reposition,
rather than the immediate use of force.323
The Newark Police briefly notes that "an alternative to the use of deadly
force" shall be used, if the officer reasonably believes it will avert the
imminent danger "at no increased risk to the officer or another per-
son."
324
In contrast with the detailed tactical guidance described in the policies
above, some policies simply ape the Fourth Amendment standard. Take,
for example, the policy from Cook County, Illinois, the second-most
populous county in the country and home to Chicago, the third-most
populous city in the country. That policy states, as a general matter, that
"[o]fficers shall use an amount of force reasonable and necessary based
on the totality of the circumstances," and goes beyond the constitutional
litmus test only by noting that officers may use multiple types of force in
a given encounter-"the progressive and reasonable escalation and de-
escalation of officer applied force in proportional response to the actions
and level of resistance offered by a subject"-and prohibiting certain us-
es of force, including warning shots and firing into crowds or build-
ings.325 Departments were also quite varied in whether or which types of
force they outright prohibited. A series of departments prohibited
chokeholds, neck holds, hogties, or using a range of non-approved
weapons like "blackjack[s], sap[s], nunchaku[s], kempo stick[s], brass
knuckle[s], or weighted glove[s]" but others did not.326 Almost all pro-
322 Seattle Police Dep't, Manual, Title 8, 8.100, De-Escalation (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manualltitle-8--use-of-force/8100--de-escalation
[htts://perma.cc/87DC-92J7].
3 Phila. Police Dep't, Directive 10.1, Use of Force - Involving the Discharge of Firearms
6 (Sept. 18, 2015).
324 Newark Police Dep't, Order 63-2, supra note 314, at 6.
325 Cook Cty. Sheriffs Office, Sheriffs General Order 11.2.1.0, Response to Re-
sistance/Use of Force Policy 1, 8 (May 23, 2011).
326 See D.C. Metro. Police, Use of Force, supra note 312 at 13; see also, e.g., Seattle Police
Dep't, Manual, Title 8, 8.300, Use of Force Tools (Sept. 1, 2015),
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hibited use of warning shots, and most sharply restricted using firearms
from moving vehicles except in highly exigent circumstances. The
choice to permit a type of use of force at all can, in our view, create rea-
sonableness concerns. Take for example, vehicle pursuits, where, ac-
cording to a 2008 study by the IACP, the majority of police agencies al-
low officers to initiate a vehicle pursuit for any civil or criminal offense
or are only slightly more restrictive in that they permit vehicle pursuits
for any criminal offense (including misdemeanors, but excluding civil
traffic offenses), even though between twenty and forty percent of all
vehicle pursuits end in injury or property damage.327
In sum, even the largest police agencies have varying policies, how-
ever most counsel the minimization of force and provide guidance on
key tactical lessons, such as the principles of conflict avoidance and de-
escalation that can protect the lives of officers and members of the pub-
lic.
328
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine exerts real pull on
these police policies. About half of the policies relied upon language
from Graham and the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment cases when
setting out their general requirements for the use of force. The policies
often paraphrase Graham to say that reasonableness of force must be as-
sessed based on the "totality of the circumstances" known to the officer,
who must make a split-second decision. Only departments that adopt a
minimization or a de-escalation approach include additional factors and
otherwise qualify the "split-second approach" drawn from the constitu-
tional case law. Police training, similarly, may often mirror the constitu-
tional baseline and give short shrift to tactics intended to avoid or mini-
mize the use of force, with some use-of-force instructors advocating
against the adoption of detailed force policies because, they argue, such
policies are inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment standards.3 29 Be-
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8--use-of-force/8300--use-of-force-tools
[https://perma.cc/RS7G-AL8X] (permitting use of improvised weapons and disfavoring but
not barring the use of neck and carotid restraints when deadly force would be justified).
327 See, e.g., Cynthia Lum & George Fachner, Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and
Reform: The IACP Police Pursuit Database 37, 57 (2008), http://www.theiacp.org/
Portals/O/pdfs/Publications/Police%2OPursuit.pdf [https://penna.cc/FD8S-YZPM].
328 The Police Executive Research Forum now recommends adoption of de-escalation as
formal policy. Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 1, at Policy 4.
329 John Bostain, Use of Force: Are Continuums Still Necessary?, 4 FLETC J. 33, 33-34
(2006) (arguing that models and continuums about what force cannot be used have detri-
ments and in many cases do not adhere to case law).
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cause Graham described Fourth Amendment reasonableness as incapa-
ble of "precise definition or mechanical application," the argument goes,
providing more detailed guidance through training or policy is an at-
tempt to do what is legally impossible.
The Supreme Court case law sets a (low) floor, but not a ceiling on
how agencies handle use of force internally. Increasingly agencies pro-
vide detailed rules for reporting and reviewing all uses of deadly force
and many other types of uses of force, as well. On reporting uses of
force, while the vast majority make clear in written policies that supervi-
sory review of uses of force and reporting of uses of force is mandatory,
the policies do differ on the categories of force that must be reported,
and on what procedures are followed next. Many of the more recent pol-
icies included systematic data collection and review of uses of force, in-
cluding by some kind of review board that periodically analyzes data on
uses of force. Thirty-one of the agencies included procedures for con-
ducting systematic review of use-of-force data.33°
F. Department of Justice 14141 Consent Decrees
Some of the most detailed use-of-force policies can be found at agen-
cies that have settled consent decrees entered pursuant to Section
14141331 with the DOJ. For example, in 2003, Detroit, Michigan, en-
tered into a consent judgment with the DOJ that included detailed provi-
sions concerning witness identification and questioning policies, stop-
and-frisks, arrests, foot pursuits, data collection, as well as the use of
force.332 Regarding the use of force, the consent decree required detailed
procedures for investigating all uses of force, as well as a command-
level review of all critical firearms discharges.333 The consent decree in-
corporated a new use-of-force continuum that would detail each level of
force. On police tactics, the new policy would state that "de-escalation,
disengagement, area containment, surveillance, waiting out a subject,
summoning reinforcements or calling in specialized units are often the
appropriate response to a situation.,334 The consent decree required the
Detroit Police Department to "select an intermediate force device, which
330 See infra Appendix.
331 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
332 Consent Judgment, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258 (E.D. Mich. July 18,
2003).
333 Id. at 13-14.
334 Id. at 7.
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is between chemical spray and firearms on the force continuum," and to
establish policy and training on such a device.335 The policy on chemical
spray was altered to require officers to provide a verbal warning "and
time to allow the subject to comply" before using such spray.336 The
firearm policy would now require biannual qualification to use firearms,
and it prohibited firing at or from moving vehicles, or placing oneself in
the path of a moving vehicle.337 The use-of-force policy would have to
prohibit chokeholds unless deadly force was justified.3 8 Each of these
provisions in combination called for a far more nuanced policy than had
existed beforehand, resulting in a set of policies designed to minimize
the need to use force and to guide its use when appropriate, as well as to
collect data and study the use of force over time.
The New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") consent decree, en-
tered in July 2012, is perhaps the most expansive such decree that has
been entered into with the DOJ.339 Its provisions touch on a range of
subjects, including not just the use of force but also custodial interroga-
tions, crisis interventions, photographic line-ups, and community en-
gagement. Regarding the use of force, the changes ranged from creation
of a use-of-force review board, avoiding gender bias, new training, and
new policy provisions regarding intermediate use of force, such as ca-
nines, electronic control weapons, and chemical spray. The NOPD also
adopted a uniform reporting system for all uses of force, dividing all us-
es of force into four levels.340 With regard to our focus in this article-
tactics and the avoidance of the need to use force in the first instance-
the consent decree ordered the NOPD to draft a comprehensive use-of-
force policy that would make clear that "officers shall use advisements,
warnings, and verbal persuasion, when possible, before resorting to
force" and "force shall be de-escalated immediately as resistance de-
creases," and "when feasible" officers "will use disengagement; area
containment; surveillance; waiting out a subject; summoning reinforce-
ment; and/or calling in specialized units, in order to reduce the need for
force and increase officer and civilian safety.341 That precise language
... Id. at 8-9.
336 Id. at 9.
... Id. at 8.
338 Id.
339 Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 1, United States v.
New Orleans, No. 12-1924 (E.D. La. July 24, 2012).
340 Id. at 14-20, 23-33.
341 Id. at 14-15.
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was then incorporated into the NOPD's policies. 342 Those "use of force
principles" alone are a remarkable shift from traditional policies that of-
fered no guidance on any of those tactical tools that can be used to avoid
the need to use force.
G. Race and Force
As noted in the Introduction, we would be remiss if we did not
acknowledge the troubling racial dynamics of police violence, although
a full examination of the topic is outside the scope of this piece. While
2008 data suggest that police used force in 1.4% of encounters with ci-
vilians, officers reportedly used force far more often against people who
identify as Black or African-American (3.4% of most-recent encounters)
than against people who identify as Hispanic (1.6%) or White (1.2%).
The disparity is even more apparent in the context of deadly force: Alt-
hough Blacks make up about 13.2% of the population, they make up
26.7% of the individuals killed by police in 2015 (306 of 1,146). Whites,
who make up 77.4% of the population, make up 50.7% of the individu-
als killed by police in that year (581 of 1,146).344 And Blacks are killed
while unarmed at an even higher rate: 25.8% (79 of 306) of Blacks
killed by police in 2015 were unarmed, while that was true for only
17.9% of Whites (104 of 581).145 Unfortunately, the best data that we
342 New Orleans Police Dep't, New Orleans Police Department Operations Manual, Chap-
ter 1.3, Use of Force 6 (Dec. 6, 2015).
343 Eith & Durose, supra note 150, at 12. More recent data on TASER use in Connecticut
also supports the assertion that officers use force more frequently against Black suspects
than they do against White suspects. See Dave Collins, Racial Disparities Seen in Police
Stun Gun Use, Seattle Times (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-
world/apnewsbreak-racial-disparities-in-connecticut-stun-gun-use/ [https://perma.cc/2ZX8-
6BHU].
344 People Killed by Police, supra note 155.
345 Id. It is not clear from this data whether the officers knew the individuals were un-
armed, but there are troubling implications regardless of how that question is answered. On
the one hand, if officers are aware that the individuals are unarmed, the data may suggest
that officers are more likely to use deadly force against Blacks whom they do not believe to
be armed than they are against Whites whom they do not believe to be armed. On the other
hand, if officers believe that the individuals are armed, the data may suggest that officers
may be more likely to mistakenly conclude that an unarmed Black suspect is armed than
they are that an unarmed White suspect is armed. Either conclusion has important implica-
tions for police training. For additional recent work examining the role of race and police use
of force, see Roland G. Fryer, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force 1-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/empirical-analysis-racial-differences-police-
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have cannot support any reliable estimate of how many times officers
use deadly force, whether by using a firearm or some other means, that
does not result in someone's death, but we can speculate that the statis-
tics would retain their disparity.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of that disparity is that it is so long-
standing, even if there is less disparity now than there has been in the
past.346 In 1988, Fyfe wrote that "every study that has examined this is-
sue [has] found that blacks are represented disproportionately among
those at the wrong end of police guns. 3 47 There are undoubtedly multi-
ple factors contributing to that disparity, many of which have been sug-
gested or tested-the increased officer presence and number of commu-
nity contacts in high-crime Black neighborhoods, officers' increased
perception of risk in that environment,348 the implicit bias that leads of-
ficers to perceive Black male suspects as more threatening than other
suspects, and so on-but the potential relationship between race and po-
lice tactics has been largely overlooked.349 Studies that test the role of
race in an officer's deadly-force decision making350 may ignore the role
that race plays in an officer's tactical decision to approach a situation in
a particular way, even when the officer's tactical approach may ulti-
use-force [https://perma.cc/U6HJ-L5PH]; Ctr. for Policing Equity, The Science of Justice:
Race, Arrests, and Police Use of Force 4-6 (July 8, 2016), http://policingequity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/CPE SoJ Race-Arrests-UoF2016-07-08-1130.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47L4-Q3GA].
3 6 Laurence Miller, Why Cops Kill: The Psychology of Police Deadly Force Encounters,
22 Aggression & Violent Behav. 97, 105-06 (2015) (stating 49% of the people killed by po-
lice in 1978 and 35% of the people killed by police in 1998 were Black).
347 James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 Just. Q. 165, 189
(1988).
348 Of the 563 officers feloniously killed by offenders in the ten-year period from 2005 to
2014, 39.8% were killed by Black suspects and 54.9% by White suspects. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, supra note 166.
349 Paul J. Hirschfield, Lethal Policing: Making Sense of American Exceptionalism, 30
Soc. F. 1109, 1111 (2015) (discussing the racial disparity in police killings and noting,
"much more elaborate analyses would be necessary to determine whether race decisively
influenced why black victims were confronted and how they were treated").
350 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1006, 1006, 1015 (2007)
(finding that police officers exhibit bias but perform better than civilians across a range of
factors when deciding to shoot); Lois James et al., Results from Experimental Trials Testing
Participants Responses to White, Hispanic and Black Suspects in High-Fidelity Deadly
Force Judgment and Decision-Making Simulations, 9 J. Exp. Crim. 189, 205 (2013) (finding
that that officers were more likely to hesitate before shooting a Black suspect than a White
suspect and, correspondingly, were less likely to shoot an unarmed Black suspect than an
unarmed White suspect).
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mately play a significant role in whether and how an officer makes a de-
cision to use lethal force.351 Still more problematic is the role that larger
agency strategies, such as proactive policing and stop-and-frisk policies,
may play in disproportionately generating situations in which force is
used.
III. TOWARD A TACTICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
To what extent does any of the research and policy that we explored
in Part II find its way into case law under the Fourth Amendment? De-
spite U.S. Supreme Court rulings that are almost entirely disconnected
from the reality of modem-day policing, some of the police policy and
tactics do actually inform the case law, in several surprising ways that
we highlight in this Part. However, there is also a negative feedback
loop that can be observed between the Supreme Court's rulings on the
Fourth Amendment and police policy and training, and not all of it is
productive or along the lines the Justices would have anticipated.
Influential criminologist Carl Klockars, writing about the difficulty of
defining "excessive force" at a useful level of specificity, wrote that for
policing to develop meaningful guidance, "it must go to the same source
where every other profession finds standards: within the skills of polic-
ing itself, as exemplified in the work of its most highly skilled practi-
tioners.352 He sought to define excessive force as "the use of more force
than a highly skilled police officer would find necessary to use in that
particular situation."353 Unfortunately, in developing training and poli-
cies to govern the use of force, many police agencies have turned not to
351 Officers' risk assessments and their determinations of when and how to use their au-
thority are based in part on race, and it seems no great stretch to suggest that the way an of-
ficer approaches a situation and interacts with civilians depends in part on the civilians' race.
See, e.g., Chris Cooper, Meditation in Black and White: Unequal Distribution of Empower-
ment by Police, in Not Guilty: Twelve Black Men Speak Out on Law, Justice & Life 125,
125-28 (Jabari Asim ed., 2001) (noting that police respond differently to disputes between
Whites, where officers permit parties to mediate between themselves, than they do to Blacks,
where officers are more likely to impose a solution rather than encourage or permit the par-
ties to mediate); Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 1102, 1107 (2007) (studying reaction to "shoot/don't shoot" scenarios
and finding that implicit associations between race and danger can affect an individual's de-
cision to shoot).
352 Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control, in Police Violence:
Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force 1, 8 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch
eds., 1996).
353 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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their own best practices or tactics, but to the more flexible and forgiving
legal standard adopted by the Supreme Court. In recent years, some po-
lice agencies have responded to the Supreme Court's decisions by not
using the term "use of force," but rather "response to resistance" train-
ing, reflecting that there is a continuum of force required, depending on
the circumstances. Some policies, as already described, quote or para-
phrase the Graham v. Connor standard. Some trainers also advocate us-
ing the Graham three-part test itself as part of police training, suggesting
that it is appropriate to educate officers about those Fourth Amendment
decisions that directly impacts police practices.354 Some agencies have
altered their use-of-force training, adopting a more "flexible" approach
toward the use of force in reaction to Supreme Court rulings and not
necessarily based on best practices or tactics. For example, the New
Mexico State Police and Albuquerque Police Departments recently
abandoned the "Reactive Control Model" for training on force in favor
of a more flexible approach that closely resembles the Fourth Amend-
ment "objective reasonableness" standard.355 Indeed, those departments
have "come under scrutiny" for "a rash of officer-involved shootings,356
so one wonders whether the less-restrictive training may be a cause of or
a response to potential criticism and liability for the shootings. To the
extent that police agencies rely on Supreme Court rulings to inform use-
of-force and tactics training, we view such approaches as ill advised. We
view emerging approaches that take account of police tactics as far more
promising.
A. Rethinking Graham
1. Segmenting of Force Encounters
Although decisions like Graham place heavy emphasis on the split-
second decisions that an officer must make in use-of-force situations, the
Supreme Court did not clearly rule out consideration of the reasonable-
ness of the officer's actions leading up to the decision to use deadly
354 Karen M. Blum & John J. Ryan, Recent Developments in the Use of Excessive Force
by Law Enforcement, 24 Touro L. Rev. 569, 581-82 (2008).
55 Uriel J. Garcia, New Police Training Puts Fewer Limits on Use of Force, Santa Fe New
Mexican (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/localnews/new-police-
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force (and as noted, in Graham, the Court had no occasion to actually
discuss a split-second decision, or apply any such standard to a situation
involving any split-second decision making). While the Court has not
clearly addressed to what extent its dicta emphasizing deference to split-
second decisions govern, and in what situations, some circuits continue
to find that preshooting conduct is relevant in limited circumstances to
the Fourth Amendment inquiry.357 To be sure, other courts of appeals
have rejected such an approach; as the Fourth Circuit has explained,
"[T]he Graham decision contradicts appellants' argument that, in deter-
mining reasonableness, the chain of events ought to be traced backward
to the officer's misconduct of failing to comply with the standard police
procedures .... We, as noted, disagree with any such interpretation
of Graham.
Adopting a related approach, some courts of appeals follow an ap-
proach that segments or divides the encounter into distinct parts, asking
whether the officer's conduct was reasonable during a given part (par-
ticularly where there are multiple uses of force).359 Such approaches are
... The First, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted such an approach. See, e.g.,
St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourt[s] should examine the
actions of the government officials leading up to the seizure."); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d
279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) ("A passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill
an otherwise unthreatening suspect."); Alexander v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 29 F.3d
1355, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1994); Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that whether defendant officer's reckless or deliberate conduct created the
need to use force was relevant for determining its reasonableness); see also Aaron Kimber,
Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure? The Relevance of an Officer's Pre-Seizure
Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 651, 655 (2004). The Su-
preme Court has accepted certiorari on a Ninth Circuit case raising a related question wheth-
er police may engage in "provocation" that makes force unjustified. See Los Angeles Cty. v.
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 547 (Dec. 2, 2016), granting cert. to Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815
F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2016).358 Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits are among those that reject such an approach. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan,
101 F.3d 1151, 1160-62 (6th Cir. 1996) (limiting inquiry to moments preceding the shoot-
ing); Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995) (looking to time of seizure to deter-
mine if reasonable); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (looking to infor-
mation possessed by officer at time of seizure). Distinct from considering preseizure conduct
is the question whether police should have reasonably considered or used alternative meth-
ods of responding to the subject, and some courts have rejected doing so in certain circum-
stances. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Cty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
standard is whether action is reasonable on the whole, given difficulties facing and snap
judgments required by police officers).
359 Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1105 (6th Cir. 2001); Bates v. Chesterfield
Cty., 216 F.3d 367, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2000); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.
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far more consistent with police training, supervision, and policy than are
unsegmented approaches. After all, the use-of-force continua and matri-
ces are structured to emphasize how force is not an on/off switch; in-
stead, force must be considered and reconsidered at stages during an en-
counter. What is reasonable when first approaching a compliant suspect
is very different from what is reasonable if that suspect responds aggres-
sively. And what is reasonable for an officer, working alone, to use to
defend himself from a violent suspect's punches is very different from
what is reasonable for officers to use to control the same suspect while
he is being held down by multiple officers.
2. Rulings Reflecting Police Training
Is a reasonable officer a "reasonably trained" police officer, who
would be expected to make decisions about the use of force not as a ci-
vilian, but as a police officer properly trained in tactics? Or is a reasona-
ble officer the hypothetical "reasonable man," a civilian but for the uni-
form, untrained in tactics and the use of force? We believe the former is
the appropriate understanding, but there is tension in the Fourth
Amendment case law on this point. In the use-of-force context, for ex-
ample, the Court recently held in a per curiam opinion that an officer's
decision to shoot at a fleeing vehicle from a highway overpass was not
clearly unreasonable (for qualified immunity purposes) even though do-
ing so contradicts clear and long-standing police best practices, the of-
ficer had not been trained to do so, the officer's direct supervisor in-
structed him not to do so immediately before the shooting, and properly
trained officers had already set up spike strips as an alternative means of
ending the pursuit.3 60 From the Court's perspective, it was essentially ir-
relevant that the officer did what any reasonably well-trained officer
would not have done for a variety of reasons.
1993); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The
Claybrook court, for example, broke the encounter down into: "first, the officers' approach
and confrontation of [the suspect]; second, the initial firefight... ; and third, the shots fired
after [the suspect's] move to a position behind the concrete steps." Claybrook, 274 F.3d at
1105.
360 The officer was attempting to shoot at the vehicle to disable it, but, perhaps in part be-
cause of a lack of training, he struck and killed the driver of the vehicle instead. Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306-07 (2015) (per curiam); see also id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) ("Chadrin Mullenix fired six rounds in the dark at a car traveling 85 miles per hour. He
did so without any training in that tactic, against he wait order of his superior officer, and
less than a second before the car hit spike strips deployed to stop it.").
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Compare how, in the context of recognizing a good-faith exception to
the suppression of otherwise suppressible evidence, the Court changed
the referent, asking whether a "reasonably well trained police officer
could have believed that there existed probable cause to search [defend-
ant's] house.,361 As a result, lower courts have similarly asked whether
"an objectively reasonable, well-trained officer would have known that
the search violated the Fourth Amendment.3 62 The Court has hewed to
such language in other cases, as well.3 63 Indeed, in some contexts the
Court has established doctrines based explicitly on the special training
that officers receive.3 64 Those cases do not typically discuss the content
of the training that such a reasonable officer would have received to in-
form the officer's conclusion, decision, or action. One reason, which the
Court emphasized in the search context, is that the relevant training
would chiefly consist of legal training, meaning training that "requires
officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.365
In United States v. Leon, however, the Supreme Court also quoted
Professor Jerold Israel on the importance of police training more broad-
ly:
The key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I
believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that
make officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment
and emphasize the need to operate within those limits. [An objective
361 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
362 United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2002).
363 See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) ("The analogous question in this
case is whether a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have known
that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for
the warrant.").
364 Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 988-89, 991 (2012) (per curiam) (explaining how
trained officers can identify lawful conduct as potentially dangerous); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (crediting officers with an "almost instinctive[]" ability to distin-
guish between questions related to officer safety and questions intended to obtain testimonial
evidence (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 650 (1984))); United States v. Arvi-
zu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (describing how, by virtue of their "experience and specialized
training," officers can "make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative infor-
mation available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person."' (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)
(describing how trained officers can identify lawful conduct as indicative of criminality). For
further discussion of the Court's references to, and frequently deference to, officers' training
and experience, see generally Seth Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform, 69 U.
Miami L. Rev. 429, 450 (2015).
365Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
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good-faith exception] is not likely to result in the elimination of such
programs, which are now viewed as an important aspect of police pro-
fessionalism. Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs;
the possibility that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in
borderline cases is unlikely to encourage police instructors to pay less
attention to fourth amendment limitations.366
In Malley v. Briggs, the Court re-emphasized the same point: "Police
departments and prosecutors have an obligation to instill this under-
standing in officers, and to discipline those found to have violated the
Constitution.3 67 Indeed, the Court has typically not credited concerns
about officers abusing their authority or working around constitutional
rules.3 68 Lower courts have not always carefully explored the relation-
ship between an objective standard and the content of police training,
much less discussed that language in any substantive way. Some, how-
ever, have emphasized the importance of training and policy, as to both
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, and reasonableness for purposes of
qualified immunity. Indeed, circuits, such as the Eighth Circuit, which
rejects consideration of preseizure conduct, do consider whether police
department guidelines were followed to be relevant to the question of
reasonableness.
3 69
However, the importance of training should be far more salient in the
context of police use of force. As one district court has put it, the "perti-
nent inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question of
whether a reasonably well-trained officer would know that the.., use of
force ... [was] illegal."37 Or as another district court has put it, "[t]he
central legal question is whether a reasonably well-trained officer in the
defendant's position would have known that shooting the victim was un-
reasonable in the circumstances.371 Other courts, however, have reject-
ed consideration of police tactics and training where the question is
366 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger
Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1412-13 (1977)).367 Briggs, 475 U.S. at 353 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
368 Stoughton, supra note 92, at 861-63.
369 Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Although these 'police de-
partment guidelines do not create a constitutional right,' they are relevant to the analysis of
constitutionally excessive force." (citation omitted)).
370 Davis v. Costello, 1995 WL 562282, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 1995) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Schwab v. Wood, 767 F. Supp. 574, 588 (D. Del. 1991)).
A Carpenter v. City of Bean Station, 2011 WL 5025883, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 21,
2011).
2017]
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:211
whether police should have used other methods to respond to the sus-
pect, confining the inquiry more closely to the moment in time when the
force was used.372
3. Rulings Reflecting Tactics
In other respects, lower federal courts have been more sensitive to the
importance of police tactics, in both systematic and more sporadic and
implied ways. The treatment of warnings before using force has been far
more systematic. The Supreme Court stated in Garner that warnings
should be given "where feasible" before using deadly force against a
fleeing suspect.37 3 As a result, federal courts have often cited to the need
to provide warnings before using force, both deadly and nondeadly.
374
Such rulings explain why police agencies adopt policies that state that
warnings must be provided "where feasible."
The treatment of concepts of necessity and proportionality have been
more sporadic, but still persistent in the case law. Federal courts have
asked whether force was "necessary" at all, in order to prevent escape or
accomplish an arrest.375 Lower courts have approvingly noted that offic-
ers appropriately used "measured and ascending responses" to force, fol-
lowing a proportionality approach,376 although the factors they use to de-
372 E.g., Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002).
173471 U.S. at 11-12.
374 See, e.g., Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 451 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (finding ex-
cessive force where failure to warn before deploying TASER "pushes this use of force far
beyond the pale"); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
failure to warn the plaintiff before TASERing her "militate[s] against finding [the defend-
ant's] use of force reasonable"); Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting in finding a constitutional violation that officers shot plaintiff "without (1) announc-
ing themselves as police officers, (2) ordering him to surrender, or (3) pausing to determine
whether he was actually armed"); Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1285
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding that "[t]he absence of any warning" before officer used her TASER
"makes the circumstances of this case especially troubling").
375 See, e.g., Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (asking whether force was "necessary to prevent es-
cape"); Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] jury could conclude
that little to no force was necessary or justified here.").
376 Galvan v. City of San Antonio, 435 F. App'x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting how of-
ficers "reacted with measured and ascending responses-verbal warnings, pepper spray,
hand- and arm-manipulation techniques, and then the use of a Taser"; and "did not use force
until [the plaintiffs husband] attacked [an officer]"); Jones v. Wild, 244 F. App'x 532, 533
(4th Cir. 2007) (noting that officer "gave a verbal warning prior to releasing" a police dog);
Estate of Martinez v. City of Federal Way, 105 F. App'x 897, 899 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
no liability, explaining that "[v]erbal warnings are not feasible when lives are in immediate
danger and every second matters").
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termine whether force was proportional are not consistent.377 Such ril-
ings both reflect, and may buttress, approaches that counsel minimiza-
tion and avoidance of unnecessary use of force by police.
4. Expert Testimony on Tactics
Best practices and training may also inform qualified immunity and
summary judgment rulings; and in addition, expert testimony on such
issues can inform the jury at trial. Such testimony may be particularly
relevant if the plaintiff is not only challenging the constitutionality of the
officer's conduct, but also the content of the agency's policies and train-
ing as a cause of the constitutional violation itself. Lower courts have
continued to apply some of those principles, particularly in cases alleg-
ing municipal liability for excessive use of force based on grossly inade-
quate training, policy, or supervision. Such cases are not easy to bring or
to prove under the Supreme Court's restrictive language in City of Can-
ton v. Harris; the police department must have utterly failed to train on a
subject of "obvious" importance to prevention of constitutional viola-
tions."'
Expert testimony can describe how competently trained officers are
not just trained to make split-second decisions on whether to shoot or
not-indeed, they are trained to avoid putting themselves into a position
that requires a split-second decision. In one Denver case, for example,
the Tenth Circuit described that:
Fyfe testified that "shoot-don't shoot" instruction should involve more
than the decision on pulling the trigger at the critical moment, and
should include training on how to avoid getting into that predicament
in the first place .... "I have found that police officers regard
["shoot/don't shoot" training using interactive video displays] quite
often as video games and that role-play situations in which instructors
play the part of adversaries, burglary suspects, deranged people, rob-
bers, and police officers ... assigned to deal with them are much more
effective. The cops become much more involved, and they're much
more realistic. But one film is not [adequate] certainly.,
379
377 See Alpert et al., supra note 187, at ch. 4.
378 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).




As Fyfe summarized: "You can't teach strategic judgment-judgment
on strategic skills[-]in a classroom.,
380
Courts generally allow experts to both offer their opinions on whether
the conduct of police officers comported with accepted standards in the
field of law enforcement and opine on the quality of the actual policy
and training provided in the particular law enforcement agency.38' As a
result, such expert opinion can be highly relevant to questions concern-
ing qualified immunity and substantive constitutional reasonableness of
the use of force at the motion to dismiss stage, at summary judgment,
and at trial.382 Policy and training are also highly relevant to separate
municipal liability claims, but as discussed in the next Sections, such
claims are only available following a determination that the relevant of-
ficers violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. One last source of tac-
tical information can come from manufacturers of specialized devices. A
recent Fourth Circuit ruling emphasized that the makers of the TASER,
TASER International, warned officers against using the weapon in
"drive stun" mode (physically pushing it against the suspect's body)
against mentally disturbed individuals. After officers did so against a
mentally ill suspect whom they were trying to return to a hospital, while
the suspect was sitting on the ground holding a stop sign pole, the
Fourth Circuit relied on the manufacturer's guidance and guidance from
policing organizations like the Police Executive Research Forum
("PERF") in holding that it was unreasonable to use the TASER aggres-
sively, and not just for defensive reasons.383
380 1d.
381 See, e.g., id.; Vineland v. Cty. of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (1lth Cir. 1993);
United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1577-78 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Samples v. City of Atlan-
ta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1990); McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539,
1543 (10th Cir. 1991); see also 3 Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1993 Litigation: Federal Evi-
dence § 12.08 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2013). But see, e.g., Robinson v. City of West Allis,
619 N.W. 2d 692, 699 (Wis. 2000) (finding no expert testimony necessary on the question of
reasonableness of use of force and emphasizing case-by-case inquiry).
382 How much weight courts or juries should accord such testimony depends, of course, on
whether policy and training are relevant for understanding the reasonableness of the given
encounter.
383 Armstrong v. Viii. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 905 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[A] police officer
may only use serious injurious force, like a taser, when an objectively reasonable officer
would conclude that the circumstances present a risk of immediate danger that could be mit-
igated by the use of force.").
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B. Rethinking "Reasonableness" Under Qualified Immunity
Just as the Supreme Court has indicated in one line of cases that "rea-
sonableness" under the Fourth Amendment should be informed by po-
lice training-that a reasonable officer is a reasonably well-trained of-
ficer-the qualified immunity analysis should similarly take account of
police policy and training when deciding whether an officer's conduct
should be actionable. That said, recent rulings such as Scott v. Harris
38 4
and Brosseau v. Haugen are notable in the absence of any discussion of
policy and training, instead emphasizing that the result "depends very
much on the facts of each case.385 We agree, of course, that whether a
particular use of force was justified in a particular situation will depend
on the facts of that case. But we assert that the training that an officer
has, and particularly the training that a reasonable officer would have
received, is very much a relevant circumstance that should be consid-
ered. When an officer's action is contrary to her training, or when it is
contrary to the training that a reasonable officer would have received,
the infringement of individual rights may, although not invariably, fail to
meet the Fourth Amendment reasonableness tandard. Thus, we disagree
with the suggestion in the Supreme Court's recent decision in City &
County of San Francisco v. Sheehan that disregarding training and en-
gaging in "imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless" conduct leading
up to the incident are not of constitutional relevance (although the Court
did note that the relevant training for approaching mentally ill persons
was itself highly "general[]" in nature).386
C. Rethinking Pattern and Practice Litigation
A turn in the doctrine from individual decision making to tactics and
policy cannot fully occur in the context of Section 1983 suits, which as
described under Los Angeles v. Heller and City of Canton v. Harris, are
focused on the constitutional violation by the individual officer, and on-
ly in unusual cases on systemic practices. However, DOJ pattern and
practice litigation can result in litigation directly targeting questions of
384 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
315 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam).
386 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015) (quoting
Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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policy and training at law enforcement agencies.387 Consent decrees, set-
tlement agreements, and memoranda of understanding resulting from
such DOJ litigation have resulted in changes to use-of-force policies at a
range of agencies, and as described, some of the most detailed and tac-
tics-oriented policies have been adopted in agencies pursuant to DOJ
consent decrees.388 It should be no surprise that those agreements, in
their varying forms, can result in more detailed and sometimes highly
publicized efforts to improve police tactical training and policy, alt-
hough their varying success is the subject of ongoing study.
However, one reason we have also focused on the content of Fourth
Amendment use-of-force doctrine, even if it is currently litigated so of-
ten in the individual-officer setting, is its outsized influence on police
agencies. That influence may be unwarranted, but constitutional rulings
have a gravitational pull in this area, in part, perhaps, because law en-
forcement agencies are accustomed to being highly attentive to constitu-
tional criminal procedure generally. Also unappreciated in their impact
on the potential ability of supervisors to give clear instructions to offic-
ers, decisions such as Scott v. Harris have suggested that, for constitu-
tional purposes, there is no per se impermissible use of force.389 While
best practices may continue to gradually take hold in spite of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, because tactics work to save the lives of both of-
ficers and civilians, such tactics would take hold more effectively if
Fourth Amendment doctrine did not discourage their use. Legislation
and DOJ consent decrees may continue to counter the warping effect of
387 For proposals to improve the use of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in such cases, see Rachel A.
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(2009).
388 For early examination of such litigation, see, for example, Barbara E. Armacost, Organ-
izational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 453, 528-29 (2004), and
Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 92-106
(2001). For more recent analysis of trends in such agreements, see Stephen Rushin, Federal
Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 3189 (2014).
389 As overbroad an interpretation of that language in Harris is not warranted; the Court
was rejecting an overly rigid application of Garner to a particular police-pursuit setting.
However, some U.S. courts of appeals have apparently already, according to Professor Karen
Blum, reconsidered form jury instructions that had recognized that some totally unjustified
force would be per se violative of the Fourth Amendment. On the Harris decision's impact
on jury instructions in circuits that had held certain use of force per se impermissible, see
Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies and Garner Jury In-
structions?, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 45 (2007). Clear rules and policy support the recognition of
"Garner" instructions, under which some totally unjustified force (e.g., using force on a non-
resistant subject) would be per se violative of the Fourth Amendment.
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the current constitutional standard as well. The constitutional standard
could also better stimulate sound police policy in a manner that would
protect professional agencies. One possibility would be to have a safe
harbor, perhaps in the form of per se lack of municipal liability for the
actions of officers, if an agency had adopted sound policies. Such an ap-
proach would require expanded municipal liability and a departure from
City of Canton v. Harris, for patterns and practices of constitutional vio-
lations, but then a safe harbor from liability for practices that reflect
sound policy. The DOJ, of course, could more formally announce guide-
lines insulating agencies that adopt sound policies from Section 14141
litigation. Legislation at the state level could do the same. All of these
approaches could better connect civil rights litigation to the substance of
policies that can save lives.
CONCLUSION
The State of Ohio, following shootings like those of twelve-year-old
Tamir Rice in Cleveland Park, adopted for the first time a statewide pol-
icy on police use of deadly force. It begins by stating: "[P]reservation of
human life is of the highest value in the State of Ohio." However, it ends
by noting deadly force may be used by police not just to defend them-
selves or others from serious injury or death, but as another category of
the permitted use of force, "in accordance with U.S. and Ohio Supreme
Court decisions, specifically, Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Con-
nor." The addition of that language is telling. Police apparently sought
it, tacitly recognizing that Supreme Court case law permits use of deadly
force otherwise not justified by sound decision making or policy.3 90 Un-
der our approach, decision making and litigation in the wake of a shoot-
ing like the Rice shooting would be quite different. There still might be
litigation, a battle of the experts, and factual disputes about what officers
did and whether doing so was reasonable and whether the preferred
practice is adequately supported by practice and by research. However,
no prosecutor or civil attorney could blithely conclude that no legal ac-
countability could result solely because the officers acted "reasonably"
in the split-second moments during which force was used. Under our
390 Mark Gokavi, Ohio Adopts First-Ever Police Standards on Deadly Force, Dayton Daily





approach, expert reports like those solicited by the prosecutor in the Rice
case would be soundly ignored as irrelevant or, at best, incomplete. A
tactical Fourth Amendment analysis would focus on whether officers
acted contrary to sound police tactics by unreasonably creating a deadly
situation, and asking whether a cautious approach could have given
them time to take cover, give warnings, and avoid the need to use deadly
force.
The story of modern Fourth Amendment doctrine is a story of judicial
neglect of the importance of police tactics, in a context in which the
structure of liability focuses judges on individual officers and not police
policy, followed by a troubling translation of that ill-suited doctrine into
some police policies as agencies "teach to the test" by adopting less rig-
orous training and policy. How did casual language from Graham result
in erosion of an approach, which continues to be stated in other aspects
of Fourth Amendment law, that a reasonable officer is a well-trained of-
ficer? Perhaps it is an unfortunate symptom of the influence of constitu-
tional law on police departments, even where the constitutional floor is
not actually designed to inform policy and decision making. Modern
Fourth Amendment use-of-force doctrine has been developed in the con-
text of civil suits seeking compensation, and authorizing, perhaps with
the best intentions, an approach to police tactics emphasizing maximum
flexibility for officers to make split-second decisions that needlessly en-
dangers officers, bystanders, and suspects. The Justices for good reasons
have sought to protect police discretion from burdensome liability for
discretionary decisions. However, as developed in this Article, much of
the case law does not and is not intended to inform that discretion. In
better-considered rulings, beginning with Garner, but reflected in search
and seizure law and in other areas, such as the law of interrogations, the
Supreme Court Justices and lower courts have engaged with the quality
and content of policy and training that informs well-trained officers
making reasonable decisions. Officers are not trained to simply react in
the moment, and police departments would be gravely remiss to fail to
discipline officers that do not use sound tactics to minimize the need for
force. Moreover, as developed in Part II, a substantial body of empirical-
ly supported tactics has evolved to better inform police use of force, alt-
hough to be sure, some applications of tactics remain untested, and poli-




To reorient the Fourth Amendment doctrine, constitutional reasona-
bleness must be grounded in tactics. Fourth Amendment reasonableness
should reflect objective standards of care, and not ratify split-second de-
cision making. A reasonable officer is a well-trained officer, and a well-
trained officer has received instruction and detailed guidance on sound
police tactics. When research and experience has established a clear best
practice, that practice should be incorporated into Fourth Amendment
analysis. While much research has yet to be done on policing, at present,
a range of key improvements has been made based on police-tactics re-
search that can promote the minimization of the use of force, including
an emphasis on creating time, using distance, issuing clear verbal warn-
ings, and engaging in de-escalation. A tactical understanding of the
Fourth Amendment would do much to recover what has been lost in the
decades since Garner, without unfairly burdening police agencies, and
instead bolstering the role of sound policy, police supervision, and train-
ing.
This Article has developed a theory of use of force grounded in po-
lice-tactics research and designed to accomplish law enforcement goals
while protecting the lives of officers and citizens. Only a tactical Fourth
Amendment can restore the Constitution to relevance for law enforce-
ment, and as a meaningful source of protection for the lives of citizens
and police. Without an overhaul, the Fourth Amendment doctrine of use
of force will fade into irrelevance as departments build on the constitu-
tional floor, and increasing public dissatisfaction pressures lawmakers to
replace constitutional doctrines with statutory standards-and as a re-
sult, the practical regulation of the use of force will increasingly come
from other sources, such as Section 14141 litigation, state legislation,
and polic e agencies themselves.
Whether federal civil rights litigation can claim an informative role
remains equivocal and much depends on the Justices of the Supreme
Court, but also the lower federal courts that-when confronted more di-
rectly with the facts of police use of force-have adopted more sensible
approaches. Whether federal judges will heed the better angels of their
nature, relying more on a concept of the reasonably well-trained officer,
more police agencies will likely adhere to the hard-learned lessons of
police-tactics research. Our ambition in this Article is to move practice,
policy, and jurisprudence in that direction by advancing as deeply con-
sistent with both constitutional sources and research-informed police
practices, a tactical Fourth Amendment.
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APPENDIX: USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES, FIFTY LARGEST AGENCIES BY SIZE
Agency # of Force Verbal Minimiza- De- Systemic
sworn contin- warnings tion or escalation review
person- uum or required propor- or tacti- of force





New York 34,454 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City (NY)
Police
Chicago (IL) 12,042 Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Police
Los Angeles 9,920 No No Yes No No
(CA) Police
Philadelphia 6,515 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(PA) Police
Houston 5,295 No No Yes No No
(TX) Police
Washington 3,865 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(DC) Metro-
politan Police
Dallas (TX) 3,478 Yes No No Yes Yes
Police
Phoenix (AZ) 2,952 Yes Yes No No Yes
Police
Baltimore 2,949 No No No No No
(MD) Police
Miami-Dade 2,745 No Yes No No Yes
(FL) Police
Las Vegas 2,743 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(NV) Metro-
politan Police
Detroit (MI) 2,526 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police
Memphis 2,413 N/A Yes No No No
(TN) Police
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Agency # of Force Verbal Minimiza- De- Systemic
sworn contin- warnings tion or escalation review
person- uum or required propor- or tacti- of force





Milwaukee 2,294 Yes Yes No No No
(WI) Police






San Francis- 2,158 Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
co (CA) Po-
lice
Boston (MA) 2,121 Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Police
Honolulu 2,076 Yes Yes No No No
(HI) Police
Atlanta (GA) 1,940 No No No No No
Police
Columbus 1,849 Yes No No No No
(OH) Police
Baltimore 1,845 Yes Yes No No No
County (MD)
Police
San Diego 1,831 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(CA) Police
Charlotte- 1,766 Yes Yes No Yes No
Mecklenburg
(NC) Police
Austin (TX) 1,673 No No No No No
Police








Agency # of Force Verbal Minimiza- De- Systemic
sworn contin- warnings tion or escalation review
person- uum or required propor- or tacti- of force





Indianapolis 1,589 No Yes No No No
(IN) Metro-
politan Police
Fort Worth 1,528 Yes No Yes Yes No
(TX) Police
Cleveland 1,513 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(OH) Police
Denver (CO) 1,383 Yes Yes No No No
Police
Kansas City 1,363 No No No No No
(MO) Police
Fairfax 1,360 Yes Yes No No No
County (VA)
Police
Metropolitan 1,342 Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Nashville
(TN) Police
St. Louis 1,334 No No No Yes No
(MO) Police
Seattle (WA) 1,285 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police
New Orleans 1,261 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(LA) Police
Louisville 1,220 No Yes Yes Yes No
(KY) Metro
Police
Montgomery 1,121 No No No No No
County (MD)
Police
El Paso (TX) 1,067 Yes Yes No No No
Police
Miami (FL) 1,035 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police
San Jose 1,016 No No No No No
(CA) Police




Agency # of Force Verbal Minimiza- De- Systemic
sworn contin- warnings tion or escalation review
person- uum or required propor- or tacti- of force





Cincinnati 986 Yes No Yes Yes Yes
(OH) Police
Albuquerque 971 No Yes No Yes Yes
(NM) Police
DeKalb 961 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County (GA)
Police
Tampa (FL) 954 No Yes No No Yes
Police
Portland 952 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(OR) Police
Tucson (AZ) 951 Yes No No No No
Police
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